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541 
NEWDOW CALLS FOR A NEW DAY IN ESTABLISHMENT 
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE: JUSTICE THOMAS’S 
“ACTUAL LEGAL COERCION” STANDARD PROVIDES 
THE NECESSARY RENOVATION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Most Supreme Court cases fly under the radar of the national 
media.  Occasionally, however, the media finds a case worthy of being 
thrust into the spotlight.1  In 2004, the Supreme Court faced such a case 
in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow.2  The question before 
the Court was whether a public school district policy that required 
teachers to lead willing students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance 
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because of the 
inclusion of the words “under God.”3  Instead of addressing this 
question, the Court “took the easy way out”4 and sidestepped the 
substantive issue5 by concluding that the plaintiff, Michael Newdow, did 
not have standing to bring his claim.6  The Court chose this route 
because of its desire to uphold the Pledge but inability to do so under its 
current Establishment Clause jurisprudence.7  If Establishment Clause 
 
 1. See Ali Basye, Study Shows 9th Circuit Is Nation’s Most Overturned, CORP. LEGAL 
TIMES, Jan. 2005, at 54 (stating that the Newdow case “created a media and Internet blitzkrieg”). 
 2. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542. U.S. 1 (2004).  See Julia Duin, Atheist 
Spars with Skeptical Justices Over Pledge, THE WASH. TIMES, March 25, 2004, at A3 (referring to 
Newdow as a “landmark court case”). 
 3. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 4. 
 4. A Disappointing Ruling on Pledge of Allegiance, THE NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, Wash.), 
June 15, 2004, at B6 (characterizing the Newdow decision as taking “the easy way out”). 
 5. Tony Mauro, Pulling Its Punches, LEGAL TIMES, July 5, 2004, at Court Watch 1 (referring 
to the Court’s solution of Newdow as “sidestep[ping] a politically charged debate in a presidential 
election year”). 
 6. Newdow, 542 at 17. 
 7. See Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious 
Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 224 (2004) (stating 
that the Court in Newdow faced a situation where it may have been politically impossible to declare 
the Pledge unconstitutional and legally impossible to uphold the Pledge).  Compare Newdow, 542 at 
45-48 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Elk Grove Pledge Policy would be declared 
unconstitutional under the Court’s rationale in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)), with Newdow, 
542 at 29-31 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing that the Elk Grove Pledge Policy should not be 
1
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analysis is not conducive to addressing these issues, the Court needs to 
scrutinize and potentially alter its current approach.8 
Currently, the Court employs a multi-test, patchwork approach in 
determining whether a government act violates the Establishment 
Clause.9  Many Supreme Court justices and legal scholars have 
expressed concerns with the Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.10  Due to its state of “hopeless disarray,”11 it often 
produces “silly”12 and “embarrassing”13 results.14  The use of various 
 
declared unconstitutional as a matter of Supreme Court precedent). 
 8. See County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 
U.S. 573, 669 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). ( “I take it as settled law that, whatever standard the 
Court applies to Establishment Clause claims, it must at least suggest results consistent with our 
precedents and the historical practices that, by tradition, have informed our First Amendment 
jurisprudence.”). 
 9. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor argues that the Establishment Clause “cannot easily 
be reduced to a single test.”  Id.  “There are different categories of Establishment Clause cases 
which may call for different approaches.”  Id.  See also Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2868 
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court has found no single mechanical formula that can 
accurately draw the constitutional line in every [Establishment Clause] case.”).  Justice Scalia aptly 
characterized current Establishment Clause jurisprudence in his concurring opinion in Van Orden.  
Id. at 2864 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Scalia stated that he joined the opinion written by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist because it “accurately reflects [the Court’s] current Establishment Clause jurisprudence – 
or at least the Establishment Clause jurisprudence we currently apply some of the time.”  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 10. See Newdow, 542 at  33-43 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing for the inclusion of 
ceremonial deism as protected government expression under the Establishment Clause); Newdow, 
124 S. Ct. at 2327-33 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing for the “unincorporation” of the 
Establishment Clause as well as the adoption of the “actual legal coercion” test); Lamb’s Chapel v. 
Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397-401 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
judgment) (critiquing the Court’s application of the Lemon test and refuting the idea that the 
Establishment Clause prevents the government from supporting religion in general); Ralph W. 
Johnson III, Lee v. Weisman: Easy Cases Can Make Bad Law Too – The “Direct Coercion” Test is 
the Appropriate Establishment Clause Standard, 2 GEO. MASON IND. L. REV. 123 (1993) (critiquing 
the Lemon test, endorsement test, and indirect coercion test and claiming that the direct coercion test 
is the appropriate Establishment Clause standard); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a 
Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 140-157 (1992) (critiquing the Lemon test and the endorsement 
test) [hereinafter McConnell, Crossroads]. 
 11. Rosenberger v. Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(noting that “Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray”). 
 12. Newdow, 542 at 45 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Our jurisprudential confusion has led to 
results that can only be described as silly.”). 
 13. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In the past 
we have attempted to justify our embarrassing Establishment Clause jurisprudence . . . .”). 
 14. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601-602, 620.  The Court holds that the display of a crèche 
scene in a county courthouse violates the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 601-02.  However, a display 
in front of a county building which included a menorah, Christmas tree, and a sign saluting liberty 
did not violate the Establishment Clause because the combination of symbols “convey[ed] the city’s 
secular recognition of different traditions for celebrating the winter-holiday season.”  Id. at 620. 
2
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tests has not produced a clear roadmap to guide lower courts but instead 
has resulted in “a labyrinth characterized by multiple exit points.”15  In 
Newdow, Justice O’Connor and Justice Thomas recognize these 
deficiencies in the Court’s current analysis and advance alternative 
approaches.16 
The importance of bringing order and continuity to Establishment 
Clause analysis cannot be overstated.17  The overextension of this 
doctrine fosters hostility toward religion,18 infringes upon state 
sovereignty,19 and eviscerates the religious freedom of the majority.20  
Conversely, failure to uphold the Clause infringes upon the religious 
freedom of those who practice “unpopular” or minority religions.21  The 
current multi-test approach is completely inadequate because it 
cultivates uncertainty and judicial manipulation, allowing judges to 
overextend or limit its application according to their own personal 
 
 15. Donald E. Lively, The Establishment Clause: Lost Soul of the First Amendment, 50 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 681, 685 (1989) (critiquing Establishment Clause jurisprudence and identifying some focal 
points that might contribute to more principled and meaningful judicial review). 
 16. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 33-43 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2327-33 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 17. See DAVID J. BREWER, THE UNITED STATES A CHRISTIAN NATION 12 (1905) (affirming 
the importance of the Establishment Clause and the restrictions it places on Congress).  The plethora 
of scholarly writings and Supreme Court cases dealing with the Establishment Clause indicates the 
importance and uncertainty of this area of law.  See, e.g., Newdow, 542 U.S. at 124 S. Ct. at 44-53 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing for unincorporation of the Establishment Clause); Mary Ann 
Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 480 (1991) (criticizing 
incorporation of the Establishment Clause and the reasoning in Everson); Kurt T. Lash, The Second 
Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 1085 (1995) (arguing for the incorporation of the Establishment Clause). 
 18. See infra notes 105-130 and accompanying text (discussing same).  
 19. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In 
Edwards, the Court invalidated Louisiana’s Creationism Act which prevented the teaching of 
evolution in public elementary and secondary schools unless accompanied by instruction in the 
theory of creation science.  Id. at 581.  This infringed on Louisiana’s ability to govern school 
curriculum, and “it is well established that education is a traditional concern of the States.”  United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995). 
 20. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 645-46 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia 
recognizes that the Court often fails to consider the majority’s interests in religious expression.  Id. 
at 646.  See also Johnson, supra note 10, at 193 (stating that “a brief reference to [the Free Exercise 
Clause] reveals the discrimination presently imposed upon the majority of Americans by the present 
standard applied in Establishment Clause jurisprudence”). 
 21. See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 3-5 (Univ. of N.C. Press 2d ed. 
1994) (discussing the religious liberty violations that occurred when government-sponsored 
churches were established in the colonies).  Colonial governments with established religions made it 
a crime to preach without proper ordination.  Id. at 3.  Colonists were also required to attend church 
and learn the official creed or articles of faith.  Id. at 4-5.  Such practices violate one’s First 
Amendment right to exercise his or her religious beliefs.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
3
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preferences.22 
This Comment examines the concurring opinions of Justice 
O’Connor and Justice Thomas in Newdow and explores whether either 
approach is able to solve the problems inherent in the Court’s current 
analysis.23  Section II discusses the meaning of the Establishment Clause 
and explores its historical background.24  Section III outlines current 
Establishment Clause analysis and its inherent hostility toward 
religion.25  Section IV introduces O’Connor’s ceremonial deism 
approach and Thomas’s “actual legal coercion” test, as outlined in 
Newdow.26  Section V discusses the inability of O’Connor’s approach to 
solve the inherent deficiencies in the Court’s current analysis,27 whereas, 
Section VI argues that Thomas’s actual legal coercion test will bring 
consistency to Establishment Clause jurisprudence and eradicate the 
religious hostility created by the Court’s current approach.28 
II. MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The Establishment Clause provides that “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion.”29  Throughout the years, 
the Supreme Court has struggled to capture the precise meaning of this 
phrase.30  The Court has found that, at a minimum, the Establishment 
Clause must mean the following: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.  
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or 
prefer one religion over another.  Neither can force nor influence a 
 
 22. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2867 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The unintelligibility of th[e] 
Court’s precedent raises the further concern that, either in appearance or in fact, adjudication of 
Establishment Clause challenges turns on judicial predilections.”); Lee, 505 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (describing the psychological coercion test as “boundlessly manipulable”); Newdow, 542 
U.S. at 124 S. Ct. at 45 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the Court has “selectively invoked 
particular tests”).  See also Johnson, supra note 10, at 152 (claiming that the “psycho-coercion” test 
is a tool for judicial activism). 
 23. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 33-43 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 43-54 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 24. See infra notes 29-57 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 58-130 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra notes 131-204 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra notes 205-49 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra notes 250-318 and accompanying text. 
 29. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
 30. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 605.  The Court states that “[w]hatever else the Establishment 
Clause may mean . . . , it certainly means at the very least that government may not demonstrate a 
preference for one particular sect or creed.” Id. (emphasis added).  This is an example of the Court 
acknowledging its struggle to discover the meaning of the Establishment Clause.  See id. 
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss2/6
CAMPBELL1.DOC 4/14/2006  1:14:41 PM 
2006] ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT V. NEWDOW 545 
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force 
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.31 
In order to properly extract what else lies within the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause, it is necessary to consider the historical context 
surrounding its drafting.32 
A. Historical Context of the Establishment Clause 
The history and context of the Founding Era are fundamental in 
evaluating the meaning of the Establishment Clause.33  America was 
founded by refugees escaping Europe’s tyrannical religious climate.34  
However, the religious persecution did not end when the colonists 
reached the New World.35  Because the British continued to exercise 
religious dominion over the colonists through the authority of the 
 
 31. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (upholding a statute 
which authorized a board of education to reimburse parents for money they spent on busing their 
children to and from parochial schools). 
 32. See infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text. 
 33. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673-74 (1984) (upholding a crèche scene on public 
property).  In Lynch, a majority of the court said that the most effective means of interpreting the 
Establishment Clause is identifying “what history reveals was the contemporaneous understanding 
of its guarantees.”  Id. at 673.  “Historical evidence sheds light not only on what the draftsmen 
intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that Clause applied” to 
contemporaneous practices.  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (upholding legislative 
prayer).  More recently in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), Justices Scalia, White, Thomas, 
and Rehnquist affirmed that historical analysis should be the primary method of interpreting the 
Establishment Clause.  See David M. Beatty, The Forms and Limits of Constitutional Interpretation, 
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 79, 84 (2001) (analyzing the different methods of interpretation involving 
church/state and religious liberty issues).  They believe that the meaning should be determined “by 
reference to historical practice and understandings.”  Id.  See also Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 
2854, 2861-64 (2005) (recognizing that Establishment Clause analysis applied in this case was 
“driven . . . by our Nation’s history”). 
 34. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8. 
A large proportion of the early settlers of this country came here from Europe to escape 
the bondage of laws which compelled them to support and attend government-favored 
churches.  The centuries immediately before and contemporaneous with the colonization 
of America had been filled with turmoil, civil strife, and persecutions, generated in large 
part by established sects determined to maintain their absolute political and religious 
supremacy.  In efforts to force loyalty to whatever religious group [was in power], men 
and women had been fined, cast in jail, cruelly tortured, and killed.  Among the offenses 
for which these punishments had been inflicted were such things as speaking 
disrespectfully of the views of ministers of government-established churches, non-
attendance at those churches, expressions of non-belief in their doctrines, and failure to 
pay taxes and tithes to support them. 
Id. at 8-9. 
 35. See LEVY, supra note 21, at 3-5 (discussing the religious oppression created by 
government-sponsored churches in the colonies). 
5
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Church of England, the colonists faced continuing oppression once they 
settled in America.36  This religious persecution, at least in part, 
contributed to the American Revolution.37  Such turbulent circumstances 
illustrate why the Framers were hesitant to address “the subject of 
religion for fear that the discussion might lead to some form of federal 
ecclesiastical establishment” similar to the Church of England.38 
On the other hand, the Founders were deeply concerned with 
religion.39  In fact, most of them emphasized the necessary role of 
religion and morality in a flourishing republican society.40  For example, 
 
 36. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 9-10.  The religious persecution of England was “transplanted to 
and began to thrive in the soil of the new America.”  Id.  The charters granted by the King of 
England allowed the colonial leaders “to erect religious establishments which all [colonists], 
whether believers or non-believers, would be required to support and attend.”  Id.  “An exercise of 
this authority was accompanied by a repetition of many of the old-world practices and 
persecutions.”  Id. at 9-10.  See also JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 15 (Westview Press 2d ed. 2005) (“European powers, eager to 
extend their political and religious regimes, issued charters and privileges to colonial companies that 
would establish themselves in the New World under the rule of the distant mother country and 
mother church.”).  Modern theocratic regimes or government-run religion are exemplified in Middle 
Eastern countries, such as Iraq, Egypt, Israel, and Palestine.  See generally RULE OF LAW IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (Eugene 
Cotran & Mai Yamani eds., 2000). 
 37. See Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian Commonwealth: An Examination of 
Selected Nineteenth-Century Commentaries on References to God and the Christian Religion in the 
United States Constitution, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 927, 959 (1996) (noting that “some [scholars] argue 
that the colonists fought the British in part to rid themselves of religious control and establishment 
by the central government”).  “In the early part of the seventeenth century, England was a country 
of religious intolerance.”  GARY DEMAR, AMERICA’S CHRISTIAN HISTORY: THE UNTOLD STORY 53 
(2000).  Due to this intolerance, a group of Separatists left England and settled in Leyden, Holland.  
Id. at 53-54.  However, after a few years in Holland, they decided to go to the New World.  Id. at 
54. 
 38. Dreisbach, supra note 37, at 959. 
 39. See Michael W. McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism, 75 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 453, 
475 (2000) (“America’s founders appreciated that republican government would require public 
virtue, and that public virtue requires the underpinnings of religion and morality.”); Amelia J. 
Uelmen, Can a Religious Person be a Big Firm Litigator, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1069, 1087 
(1999) (“The history of the founding is replete with examples of the extent to which the founders 
regarded religion and morality as ‘indispensable supports’ to the public life of the newly born 
nation.”).  But see WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 153, 236 (paperback ed. 1986) (claiming that Paine, Jefferson, and Madison viewed 
Christianity as a “particularly murky section of the swamp of unreason”). 
 40. See NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, 1 STAT. at 52.  Article III of the Northwest Ordinance 
states that “[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the 
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”  Id.  It is 
interesting to note that the House of Representatives took up the Northwest Ordinance on the same 
day that Madison introduced the final draft of the Establishment Clause.  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S. 38, 100 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  See also THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: 
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 219 (1986).  Curry 
quotes the members of the Continental Congress as stating that “true religion and good morals are 
6
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John Adams stated that “religion and morality alone . . . can establish the 
principles upon which freedom can securely stand.”41  George 
Washington went further and stressed the absolute dependence of 
morality upon religion when he stated that “reason and experience both 
forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of 
religious principle.”42 
 
the only solid foundation of public liberty and happiness.”  Id.  See, e.g., Letter from Patrick Henry 
to Archibald Blair (Jan. 8, 1799) (“The great pillars of all government and of social life [are] virtue, 
morality, and religion.  This is the armor . . . and this alone, that renders us invincible.”); THE 
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 569 (Albert H. Smyth ed., 1970) (“. . . only a virtuous people 
are capable of freedom. As nations become corrupt and vicious, they have more need of masters.”); 
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 223 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904) (“To suppose that any form of 
government will secure liberty or happiness without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea.”); 
THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN RUSH 88 (Dagobert D. Runes ed., 1947) (“[T]he only 
foundation for a useful education in a republic is to be laid in Religion.  Without this there can be no 
virtue, and without virtue there can be no liberty, and liberty is the object and life of all republican 
governments.”).  But see Theresa Willingham, Calling Atheist Un-American Not As True As Some 
Believe, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, August 8, 2004, at North of Tampa 8 (citing quotations by many 
Founders, including Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, which are disparaging toward God 
and religion); BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD’S ALMANAC (1758 ed.) (“Lighthouses are 
more helpful than churches.”). 
 41. Letter from John Adams to Zabdiel Adams (June 21, 1776), available at 
http://www.founding.com/library/lbody.cfm?id=136&parent=54 (last visited October 25, 2005) 
(emphasis added). 
Statesmen . . . may plan and speculate for liberty, but it is religion and morality alone, 
which can establish the principles upon which freedom can securely stand. The only 
foundation of a free constitution is pure virtue; and if this cannot be inspired into our 
people in a greater measure than they have it now, they may change their rulers and the 
forms of government, but they will not obtain a lasting liberty. 
Id.  It is also interesting to note that while serving as the chairman of the Washington D.C. school 
board, Thomas Jefferson, who is often credited as coining the phrase “separation of church and 
state,” required “the use of the Bible and the Hymnal to teach reading in the public schools.”  Larry 
Linsin, Separation Wording Turns Out to be an Elusive Historical Beast, THE ASHVILLE CITIZEN-
TIMES, August 17, 2002, at A7.  Jefferson stated that “[t]he reason that Christianity is the best friend 
of government is because Christianity is the only religion that changes the heart.”  Id.  Contra John 
Thomas Bannon, Jr., The Legality of the Religious Use of Peyote by the Native American Church: A 
Commentary on the Free Exercise, Equal Protection, and Establishment Clause Issues Raised by 
the Peyote Way Church of God Case, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 475, 499-500 (1998) (stating that 
Jefferson and Madison were Enlightenment Deists who supported a “severe separation” of church 
and state). 
 42. George Washington, Farewell Address (September 17, 1796), available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/washing.htm (last modified October 25, 2005). 
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality 
are indispensable supports . . . .  The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought 
to respect and to cherish them.  . . .  And let us with caution indulge the supposition that 
morality can be maintained without religion.  Whatever may be conceded to the 
influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both 
forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle. 
Id.  Compare McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748-50 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (outlining historical evidence that indicates the Framers did not intend government 
7
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Thus, the Founders faced an unenviable position.43  They had 
experienced the problems that a government–established church would 
create, but they were also acutely aware of the necessity of establishing a 
Nation founded on religious principles.44  It was against this backdrop 
that the Founders adopted the Establishment Clause into the Bill of 
Rights.45 
B. Proper Interpretation of the Establishment Clause 
It is often said that the Establishment Clause requires complete 
“separation between church and state.”46  However, it is logically 
inconsistent to conclude that men, who stressed the importance of 
religion and morality in running an effective republican government, 
intended to isolate religion from government.47  Thus, the Founders did 
 
neutrality in matters of religion), with id. at 2743-45 (majority opinion) (outlining historical 
evidence that indicates the Framers intended the Establishment Clause to require governmental 
neutrality in matters of religion). 
 43. See Dreisbach, supra note 37, at 959. 
 44. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text. 
 45. The adoption of the Establishment Clause was much debated.  See LEVY, supra note 21, 
at 94-111 (discussing the various amendments of the Establishment Clause and the debates 
surrounding them).  The original copy of the Bill of Rights was submitted to the House on June 8, 
1789.  Id. at 94.  Originally, the section on religion read: “The civil rights of none shall be abridged 
on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the 
full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.”  Id. at 95.  After 
a few alterations and many proposed amendments, Congress finally passed the Establishment 
Clause on September 25, 1789.  Id. at 104. 
 46. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (finding that the Establishment Clause erects a “wall of 
separation between church and state”).  Thomas Jefferson coined this phrase in a letter to the 
Danbury Baptist Association.  Id.  The letter was not an exposition on the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause; rather, it was “a simple note of courtesy written fourteen years after Congress 
passed the Bill of Rights.”  James E. M. Craig, “In God We Trust,” Unless We Are A Public 
Elementary School: Making A Case For Extending Equal Access to Elementary Education, 36 
IDAHO L. REV. 529, 532 (2000).  Further, the phrase was “a mere metaphor too vague to support any 
theory of the Establishment Clause.”  PETER J. FERRARA, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: A 
REINTERPRETATION 34-35 (Free Congress Foundation 1983).  Also, it is important to remember that 
Jefferson was acting as minister to France during this time and did not directly participate in the 
drafting of the Bill of Rights.  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1879). 
 47. See Daniel P. Whitehead, Agostini v. Felton: Rectifying the Chaos of Establishment 
Clause Jurisprudence, 27 CAP. U.L. REV. 639, 654 (1999) (noting that “history simply does not 
support the strict separation of church and state”).  Our first Congress set aside federally–owned 
land to establish religious schools and appropriated money for religious organizations.  Id.  The 
Continental Congress imported 20,000 Bibles.  Id.  On the day after the First Amendment was 
adopted by Congress, the House and Senate both adopted a resolution which requested that the 
President “recommend to the people of the United States a day of public fasting and prayer, to be 
observed, by acknowledging with grateful hearts, the many signal favors of the Almighty God.”  Id.  
See also J. Clifford Wallace, The Framers’ Establishment Clause: How High the Wall?, 2001 BYU 
L. REV. 755, 764-67 (2001) (discussing actions by the Framers which indicate that they did not 
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not intend to “level all religions”48 or erect a “wall between the church 
and the state.”49  Instead, they were concerned with preventing the 
problems that had haunted their past – specifically those caused by a 
national church.50 
Relying upon the Founders’ intent as well as other practical 
concerns, the Court has expressly denounced a complete church/state 
separation approach to Establishment Clause jurisprudence.51  As a 
corollary, the Court has rejected an absolutist analysis which would 
“mechanically invalidat[e] all governmental conduct or statutes that 
confer benefits or give special recognition to religion in general.”52  
Instead, the Court has properly held that the “government may (and 
sometimes must) accommodate religious practices” without fear of 
violating the Establishment Clause.53 
 
intend to create a complete separation of church and state). 
 48. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: 
VOLUME 2 § 1874 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1891).  Justice Story was the one of the leading 
constitutional scholars of his time, and he published “the most comprehensive treatise on the United 
States Constitution that had then appeared.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 104 (1985) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting).  According to Story, at the time of the adoption of the Establishment Clause: 
[T]he general if not the universal sentiment in America was that Christianity ought to 
receive encouragement from the State so far as was not incompatible with the private 
rights of conscience and the freedom of religious worship.  An attempt to level all 
religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would 
have created universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation. 
STORY, supra at § 1874. 
 49. See Craig, supra note 46, at 532-34 (arguing that the “wall of separation between church 
and state” was not intended by the Framers).  See generally DEMAR, supra note 37, at 145-57 
(arguing that the Establishment Clause does not requires a secular government entirely separate 
from religion).  The late Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that “[t]here is simply no historical 
foundation for the proposition that the Framers intended to build the ‘wall of separation.’”  Wallace, 
472 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 50. STORY, supra note 48, at § 1877. 
 51. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673. 
No significant segment of our society and no institution within it can exist in a vacuum 
or in total or absolute isolation from all the other parts, much less from government.  It 
has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total 
separation . . . .  Nor does the Constitution require complete separation of church and 
state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, 
and forbids hostility toward any.  Anything less would require the “callous indifference” 
we have said was never intended by the Establishment Clause.  Indeed, we have 
observed, such hostility would bring us into “war with our national tradition as embodied 
in the First Amendment’s guaranty of the free exercise of religion.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 52. Id. at 678. 
 53. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (quoting 
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987)).  Short of 
establishing a government church or infringing on citizen’s free exercise rights, there is ample room 
for the government to engage in the realm of religion.  See Walz v. Tax Comm’n of the City of New 
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The heart of the Establishment Clause, as expressed by its drafter 
James Madison, is that the government “should not establish a religion 
and enforce the legal observation of it by law.”54  The Framers’ primary 
goal in adopting the Establishment Clause was to prevent the oppression 
associated with a government-established church.55  Such persecution 
and maltreatment included mandatory church attendance, taxation for 
the direct support of a particular religious sect, and punishment of 
nonbelievers.56  Inherent in these problems was the government’s use of 
actual legal force, or threat of force, to uphold the power of the 
established church.57 
III. SUPREME COURT’S CURRENT METHOD OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has two prominent 
characteristics.  First, the multi-test approach has created a lack of 
certainty which impedes consistent legal analysis.58  Second, the tests 
 
York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).  Chief Justice Burger wrote: 
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been said by 
the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or 
governmental interference with religion.  Short of those expressly proscribed 
governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent 
neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without 
interference. 
Id. 
 54. LEVY, supra note 21, at 97.  Madison seemed to indicate that the language of the 
Establishment Clause was instrumental in preventing the establishment of a national religion.  Id. at 
100.  He stated that the Clause was inserted to satisfy the State Conventions who were concerned 
that Congress “might infringe the rights of conscience and establish a national religion.”  Id.  See 
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  The late Chief Justice Rehnquist summarized 
the meaning of the Establishment Clause as forbidding both establishment of a national religion and 
preference among religious sects.  Id.  But see Everson, 330 U.S. at 52 (arguing that the heart of the 
Establishment Clause, as illustrated by Madison’s Remonstrance, is that the state cannot aid nor 
forbid religious activities). 
 55. STORY, supra note 48, at § 1877.  Story expressed the proper meaning of the 
Establishment Clause: 
The real object of the [First Amendment] was . . . to exclude all rivalry among Christian 
sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment which should give to a 
hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government.  It thus cut off the means 
of religious persecution (the vice and pest of former ages), and of the subversion of the 
rights of conscience in matters of religion . . . . 
Id. 
 56. See LEVY, supra note 21, at 3-5 (highlighting the many problems associated with an 
established religion). 
 57. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 50-52 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 640-41 
(Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 58. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2867 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
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have been applied in a manner which prevents the government from 
addressing religious issues, thus manifesting hostility toward religion in 
general.59 
A. Four Approaches to Establishment Clause Analysis 
Currently, the Court employs four different approaches in its 
Establishment Clause analysis.60  The greatest deficiency in this multi-
test approach is that the Court lacks specified criteria dictating what test, 
if any, should apply in a given situation.61  Whenever an Establishment 
issue arises, the Court must wade through a pool of uncertainty thereby 
precluding consistent legal analysis.62 
1. The Lemon Test 
The Supreme Court’s oldest Establishment Clause test was 
developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman.63  The Lemon test sets out three 
prongs that government action must satisfy in order to avoid violating 
 
very ‘flexibility’ of this Court’s Establishment Clause precedent leaves it incapable of consistent 
application.”).  See also infra notes 60-104 and accompanying text. 
 59. See infra notes 105-130 and accompanying text. 
 60. Jennifer Carol Irby, Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe: The Constitutional 
Complexities Associated With Student-Led Prayer, 23 CAMPBELL L. REV. 69, 70-75 (2000) 
(providing a brief overview of the four Establishment Clause tests applied by the Supreme Court). 
 61. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.  In Lynch, Justice Burger discusses how cases have arisen 
where the Court has not found the Lemon test to be “relevant” or “useful” and has thus applied 
another approach.  Id.  However, the Court provides no guidance as to when Lemon should not be 
used and what alternative approach should apply.  Id.  See also Newdow, 542 U.S. at 43  (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (stating that the Court “selectively invoke[s] particular tests”).  But see id. at 33 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the endorsement test should be employed when the Court 
“confronts a challenge to government–sponsored speech or displays”). 
 62. See Theologos Verginis, ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board: Is There 
Salvation for the Establishment Clause? “With God All Things Are Possible,” 34 AKRON L. REV. 
741, 743-48 (2001) (stating that current Establishment Clause jurisprudence utilizes many tests and 
results in uncertain analysis).  See also Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2866 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he incoherence of the Court’s decisions in this area renders the Establishment Clause 
impenetrable and incapable of consistent application.”).  Furthermore, the “unintelligibility of th[e] 
Court’s precedent raises the further concern that, either in appearance or in fact, adjudication of 
Establishment Clause challenges turns on judicial predilections.”  Id. at 2867.  “The outcome of 
constitutional cases ought to rest on firmer grounds than the personal preferences of judges.”  Id. 
 63. 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971).  The litigation in this case involved two statutes that 
provided aid to nonpublic schools.  Id. at 606.  The Pennsylvania statute provided reimbursement to 
nonpublic schools for salaries, textbooks, and instruction materials involving secular subjects.  Id. at 
606-607.  The Rhode Island statute provided a 15% salary increase to teachers at nonpublic schools.  
Id. at 607.  The Court held that both statutes were unconstitutional violations of the Establishment 
Clause because they fostered “excessive and enduring entanglements between state and church.”  Id. 
at 619. 
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the Establishment Clause: (1) it must have a secular purpose; (2) its 
primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) it must 
avoid “excessive government entanglement with religion.”64  Generally, 
analysis under the Lemon standard has treated the three prongs as 
determinative; however, on at least two occasions, the Court referred to 
the prongs as “helpful signposts.”65  Application of the first prong has 
proved troublesome due to the perplexity of determining legislative 
intent66 as well as insufficient guidance on what constitutes a “secular 
purpose.”67  Likewise, the Court has failed to adequately define the 
second and third prongs, thus contributing to Lemon’s inconsistent and 
unpredictable results.68  Throughout the years of its use, the Lemon test 
 
 64. Id. at 612-613.  Justice Burger claimed that these elements arose from a “consideration of 
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years.”  Id. at 612.  Interestingly, Burger 
does not cite authority for the secular purpose prong.  Id.  It is difficult to see how an element that 
has been “developed by the Court over many years” does not find support in the Court’s prior 
decisions. See id.  
 65. See, e.g., Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2861 (noting that the three prongs of the Lemon test are 
“no more than helpful signposts”); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (same).  See also Kirk 
A. Kennedy, Opportunity Declined: The Supreme Court Refuses to Jettison the Lemon Test in 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,, 73 NEB. L. REV. 408, 431 n.78 (1994) (noting three 
cases in which “the Lemon test was either completely ignored or not determinative to the decision”). 
 66. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-39 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
Legislators can bypass this prong by removing all references to a religious purpose.  Wallace, 472 
U.S. at 108 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 67. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 613-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The Court has held that the 
Lemon test does not require an “exclusively secular” purpose, but merely a secular purpose.  See 
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681 n.6.  But see Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[The 
secular purpose] requirement is not satisfied, however, by the mere existence of some secular 
purpose, however dominated by religious purposes.”).  If the test required “exclusively secular” 
objectives, then most of the government action approved by the Supreme Court would have to be 
struck down under Lemon.  Id. at 681 n.6.  Traditionally, the Court has bypassed this portion of the 
inquiry as long as “a plausible secular purpose appears on the face of the challenged statute or 
policy,” thus rendering it superfluous.  Johnson, supra note 10, at 158-159.  But see McCreary 
County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2734-35, 2741 (2005) (reaffirming the importance 
of inquiring into the purpose for a particular government action and noting that “purpose needs to be 
taken seriously under the Establishment Clause and needs to be understood in light of context”).  
Recently, in McCreary, the Supreme Court provided some clarity to the purpose prong by requiring 
that the “the secular purpose [must] be genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious 
objective.”  Id. at 2735. 
 68. See David E. Steinberg, Alternatives to Entanglement, 80 KY. L.J. 691, 726-727 (1992).  
With respect to the second prong, “[t]he Court has failed to clearly identify government conduct that 
has the primary effect of advancing religion.”  Johnson, supra note 10, at 160.  Likewise in dealing 
with the excessive entanglement prong, the Court has done little to define the term except to say that 
it involves regular contacts between government and religion.  Id. at 165.  See also Thomas Marvan 
Skousen, The Lemon in Smith v. Mobile County: Protecting Pluralism and General Education, 
1997 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 69, 83 (1997) (noting that the Court’s inconsistency in applying Lemon 
implicates the judiciary in its “outcome determinative” behavior).  The three poorly–defined prongs 
“have been manipulated to fit whatever result the Court aimed to achieve.”  McCreary, 125 S. Ct. 
2722, 2757 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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has been used to invalidate government practices which have been in 
place for a significant portion of our Nation’s history.69 
Despite its historical significance, Lemon has lost support among 
many members of the Court.70  However, the Supreme Court has yet to 
explicitly overrule the test.71  As it currently stands, Lemon remains a 
“ghoul . . . that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after 
being repeatedly killed and buried.”72  But the Court’s heavy criticism 
and sparse application of Lemon has opened the door for the remaining 
tests to move to the forefront.73 
 
 69. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp.v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that a 
statute requiring the recitation of the Lord’s prayer before school was a violation of the 
Establishment Clause); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding that a Kentucky statute 
requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public classrooms was a violation of the 
Establishment Clause). 
 70. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 656 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing the use of the Lemon 
test and how a “[s]ubstantial revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order”); 
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the Lemon test is “a constitutional 
theory that has no basis in the history of the amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply, 
and yields unprincipled results”); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429 (1985) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (expressing doubts about the entanglement prong of the Lemon Test); Edwards, 482 
U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that Rehnquist’s pessimistic evaluation of the 
Lemon test “is particularly applicable to the ‘purpose’ prong”).  Moreover, Justice Souter expressed 
his dissatisfaction with the Lemon test at his confirmation hearings.  See Linda Greenhouse, 
Supreme Court to Take Fresh Look at Disputed Church-State Boundary, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 
1991, at A16.  But see Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 463 (1994) (urging a renewed commitment to the Lemon test in Establishment Clause 
issues). 
 71. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397-400 
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (declining to overturn Lemon).  
 72. Id. at 398.  Justice Scalia comments that “[t]he secret of the Lemon test’s survival . . . is 
that it is so easy to kill.  It is there to scare us . . . when we wish it to do so, but we can command it 
to return to the tomb at will.”  Id. at 399.  “Such a docile and useful monster is worth keeping 
around, at least in a somnolent state; one never knows when one might need him.”  Id.  For 
example, when the Court wishes to invalidate an action that the test forbids, it applies the test; 
however, when the Court wants to uphold an action that the test forbids, it ignores Lemon 
completely.  Compare Aguilar, 473 U.S. 402 (using the Lemon test to invalidate a state remedial 
education program administered in part in parochial schools), with Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 
783 (1983) (ignoring the Lemon test and upholding legislative prayer). 
 73. See Verginis, supra note 62, at 744-45 (noting that the Court’s migration away from the 
Lemon test allows other tests to replace it).  In one of the Supreme Court’s most recent 
Establishment Clause case, it recognized that the Lemon test was “not useful in dealing with the sort 
of passive monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol grounds.”  Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 
2861.  Nevertheless, the Court has shown a willingness to consider the ongoing validity of the 
Lemon test.  For example, in McCreary, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005), one of the certified questions was 
whether the Court should continue to apply the Lemon test.  See Nathan Lewin, Thou Shalt Not 
Erase God, LEGAL TIMES, February 28, 2005, at 50 (stating that the argument for the state of 
Kentucky in the McCreary case asked the Court to substantially alter or replace the Lemon test).  In 
the end, however, the Court decided not to overturn the Lemon test, specifically upholding and 
strengthening the purpose prong.  See McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2734-35. 
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2. The Endorsement Test 
The next analytical tool, the endorsement test, is used primarily 
when the Court “confronts a challenge to government-sponsored speech 
or displays.”74  It originally was advocated by Justice O’Connor75 and is 
gaining support from the rest of the Court through more frequent 
application.76  This approach forbids “government endorsement or 
disapproval of religion.”77  It seeks to prevent the government from 
“mak[ing] a person’s religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in 
the political community by conveying a message that religion or a 
particular religious belief is favored or preferred.”78  Analysis under the 
endorsement test takes the perspective of a reasonable observer in the 
community and considers the overall context of the questioned activity.79 
Like Lemon, “the endorsement test is flawed in its fundamentals 
and unworkable in practice.”80  Justice Kennedy has recognized that 
 
 74. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 33 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  In this context the word 
“endorsement” is translated to mean “promotion.”  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593.  However, one of the 
largest flaws in this test is the inability to define endorsement or promotion.  McConnell, 
Crossroads, supra note 10, at 148.  Such a definitional deficiency will perpetuate inconsistent legal 
analysis.  Id.  It is nothing more than an application to the Religion Clauses of the principle: “I know 
it when I see it.”  See William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”: The Supreme Court 
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986) (noting that Establishment Clause jurisprudence is 
primarily “symbolic,” implying that it is concerned with eliminating the perception of improper 
government action). 
 75. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 772-774 
(1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that “the purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion [is] a 
concern that has long had a place in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence”); Allegheny, 492 U.S. 
at 627 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the “endorsement test captures the essential command 
of the Establishment Clause, namely, that government must not make a person’s religious beliefs 
relevant to his or her standing in the political community”); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (noting that endorsement infringes upon the religious liberty of the nonadherent); 
McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2747 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (indentifying a particular government 
display as unconstitutional because it “conveys an unmistakable message of endorsement to the 
reasonable observer”). 
 76. See Verginis, supra note 62, at 744-745.  The Court has begun to apply the endorsement 
test with greater frequency and the victim has been the Lemon test.  Id.  The Court recently 
employed a variation of the endorsement test in McCreary, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005). 
 77. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 78. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 33 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Endorsement “sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community.”  Id. 
 79. Id. at 33-35.  Adopting a subjective approach would be unworkable.  Id. at 33.  It would 
subject any governmental activity to a “heckler’s veto.”  Id. at 35. 
 80. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 669 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Upon close examination, one 
realizes that the endorsement test is really a combination of the purpose and effect prongs of the 
Lemon test.  Daniel Parish, Private Religious Displays in Public Fora, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 257 
(1994) (establishing parameters for courts and municipalities confronted with private citizens who 
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faithful analysis under this test produces results that are inconsistent with 
history and tradition.81  Moreover, the application of the endorsement 
test is biased against religion.82  While on its face the test appears even-
handed because it expressly condemns both actions that “endorse” 
religion and actions that “disapprove” of religion, it is one-sided in 
application.83  By their very nature, actions which disapprove of religion 
cannot constitute an establishment of religion because the term 
“establishment” connotes actions imbuing government approval or 
support for religion.84  Thus, the endorsement test has never been applied 
to invalidate government activity which condemns religion.85  Another 
intrinsic problem with the endorsement test is that, carried to its logical 
end, it requires complete “separation of church and state” in order for the 
government to avoid the appearance of endorsing religion over 
“irreligion.”86  The Court, however, has expressly denounced a 
“complete separation” approach to Establishment Clause analysis.87  
 
wish to adorn their local parks with crèches, menorahs, or reindeer-drawn sleds).  “[The 
endorsement test] asks explicitly what the Lemon test implies: Does the government ‘subjectively’ 
intend to endorse religion, or could an audience ‘objectively’ interpret the government’s actions as 
endorsing religion?”  Id.  Because the endorsement test is largely based on two of the three prongs 
of the Lemon test, the endorsement test suffers from many of the same deficiencies as Lemon.  
McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 10, at 151.  Specifically, the endorsement test suffers from at 
least three fundamental flaws: “(1) uncertainty as to who is the relevant person to judge the effect of 
the government act, (2) malleability of results reached by the application of the test due to its 
inherent subjectivity and heavy factual dependence, and (3) inability of the test to account for past 
decisions of the Court.”  The Supreme Court, 1988 Term: Leading Case: I. Constitutional Law, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 137, 234 (1989). 
 81. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670.  “The touchstone of an Establishment Clause violation is 
whether nonadherents would be made to feel like ‘outsiders’ by government recognition or 
accommodation of religion.”  Id.  “Few of our traditional practices recognizing the part religion 
plays in our society can withstand scrutiny under a faithful application of this formula.”  Id. 
 82. McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 10, at 152.  The endorsement test is not only biased 
against religion in general, it is also biased against uncommon religions.  Id. at 154.  If a practice is 
“longstanding” and “nonsectarian,” it is unlikely to “convey a message of endorsement of particular 
religious beliefs.”  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630-31 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Therefore, messages 
affirming mainstream, nonsectarian religions are likely to be familiar and seem inconsequential.  
McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 10, at 154. 
 83. McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 10, at 152. 
 84. Id.  “Disapproval of religion is not an ‘establishment’ of religion because the government 
typically has a secular purpose for its action, and because there is no ‘religion’ that is being 
‘established.’”  Id. 
 85. McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 10, at 152. 
 86. See Derek P. Apanovitch, Religion and Rehabilitation: The Requisition of God by the 
State, 47 DUKE L.J. 785, 799 (1998) (acknowledging that the endorsement test is consistent with the 
principle of “separation between church and state”). 
 87. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673.  In Lynch, Justice Burger states the following: “Nor does the 
Constitution require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates 
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any.”  Id. 
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Finally, this test implicates vast judicial discretion and yields 
inconsistent results.88 
3. The Psychological or Indirect Coercion Test 
The Court’s newest test is the “psychological coercion test.”89  It 
originated with Justice Kennedy in Lee v. Weisman90 and states that the 
“government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion 
or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which establishes a state 
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.”91  This test prevents the 
government from coercing citizens by indirect means, and thus it is also 
known as the “indirect coercion test.”92  In contrast to the endorsement 
test, the psychological coercion test focuses on the subjective effect of 
the governmental action, not just its objective appearance.93  Currently, 
the Court has applied the coercion test only in the context of school 
prayer.94 
 
 88. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601-02, 620.  See also Stephen B. Presser, The Rehnquist 
Court: Outsiders, Swing Justices, and Original Understanding: Can the Religion Clauses be Saved? 
A Comment on Greenawalt, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 177, 181-82 (2004) (stating that the endorsement test 
“seems to do nothing but leave complete discretion in the hands of the judges, which can hardly be 
what the rule of law comprehends”). 
 89. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.  It is possible to think of two interpretations of coercion.  Gidon 
Sapir, Religion and State – A Fresh Theoretical Start, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 591 (1999) 
(arguing for a new model in order to achieve religious freedom).  There is a narrow and broad 
coercion.  Id.  The narrow view of coercion only recognizes coercion when one is compelled by 
force or threat of force.  Id.  This is the definition of coercion used by Justice Thomas.  See 
Newdow, 542 U.S. at 52 (Thomas, J., concurring).  On the other hand, the broad view of coercion 
includes both persuasion and force.  Sapir, supra note 89, at 591.  This is the view of coercion 
which forms the basis of Justice Kennedy’s psychological coercion test.  See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. 
 90. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 91. Id. at 587. 
 92. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 125 (classifying this approach as the “psycho/indirect 
coercion test”).  See also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000).  In Santa Fe 
Independent School District, the Court held that a school policy permitting a student to pray before 
high school football games violated the Constitution.  Id. at 317.  The Court reasoned that the 
Establishment Clause prevented the government from “us[ing] social pressure to enforce 
orthodoxy.”  Id. at 312.  It further found that forcing a “nonbeliever [to] respect [one’s] religious 
practices” in this context was a form of unconstitutional coercion.  Id.  The discomfort that a 
nonbeliever feels when he or she is subjected to prayer at a public school sporting event is an 
example of indirect psychological coercion.  See id. 
 93. Jeremy Speich, Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe: Mapping the Future of 
Student-Led, Student-Initiated Prayer in Public Schools. 65 ALB. L. REV. 271, 278 (2001) (arguing 
that student-led, student-initiated prayer is constitutionally permissible in public school). 
 94. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. 577 (invalidating prayer at a public school graduation ceremony); 
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 290 (invalidating prayer at a public school football game); 
Newdow, 542 U.S. at 45-48 (Thomas, J., concurring) (applying the psychological coercion test will 
force the Court to invalidate California’s Pledge policy as a violation of the Establishment Clause).  
The psychological coercion test is applied to school prayer cases due to the “heightened concerns 
16
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Scholars have criticized this analytical approach because of the 
tenuous connection between indirect forms of coercion and 
Establishment Clause violations.95  Moreover, judges are ill-equipped to 
inquire into matters of psychology and determine whether an individual 
is unjustly influenced or coerced by social pressure.96  Justice Scalia has 
characterized this test as a “bulldozer of . . . social engineering” which is 
“boundlessly manipulable” by the Court.97  If expanded outside the 
context of school prayer, this test can be used to further the agenda of 
activist judges.98 
4. The Marsh Approach 
Additionally, the Court has, in some instances, not used any test at 
all.99  In Marsh v. Chambers,100 the Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s 
application of the Lemon test101 and instead relied on history and 
tradition to find that congressional prayer is constitutional under the 
Establishment Clause.102  The Court infered from the Founders’ adoption 
and approval of legislative prayer that it does not violate the 
Constitution.103  Analytical reliance upon tradition and original intent, as 
 
with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and 
secondary public schools.”  Lee, 505 U.S. at 592.  This language seems to suggest that application 
of this test is limited to this context involving young school children.  Marilyn Perrin, Lee v. 
Weisman: Unanswered Prayers, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 207, 253 (1993) (analyzing the educational, 
legislative, judicial, and social impacts of the Lee decision). 
 95. See Mark A. Boatman, Lee v. Weisman: In Search of a Defensible Test for Establishment 
of Religion, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 773, 824 (1993) (noting that Justice Scalia feels that the 
psychological coercion test’s causal connection is too tenuous to justify triggering the Establishment 
Clause). 
 96. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia sees no reason to 
“expand[] the concept of coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty – a brand of coercion 
that, happily, is readily discernible to [judges] who have made a career of reading the disciples of 
Blackstone rather than of Freud.”  Id. 
 97. Lee, 505 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia emphasizes that this test has no 
grounding in history, and it will be employed to eradicate activities which the Court has 
traditionally upheld as constitutional under the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 631-32. 
 98. Johnson, supra note 10, at 152. 
 99. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (holding that legislative prayer does not 
violate the Establishment Clause). 
 100. Id.  This case challenged the Nebraska legislature’s practice of beginning each session 
with prayer by a paid chaplain.  Id. at 784.  The Supreme Court, relying on history and tradition, 
held that legislative prayer did not violate the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 792. 
 101. Id. at 786.  Using the Lemon test, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the 
practice of legislative prayer because it had a religious purpose and invalidated the practice of 
paying the chaplain because it created entanglement.  Id. at 786. 
 102. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786. 
 103. Id. at 790. 
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displayed in Marsh, is exceedingly rare in recent Establishment Clause 
cases.104  Because the Court has used this type of analysis in only one 
case involving extremely limited facts, this approach will be largely 
ignored throughout this Comment. 
B. Hostility Toward Religion in Current Establishment Clause 
Jurisprudence 
Throughout the years, the Court has spoken unconvincingly of the 
need to avoid enmity toward religion in its Establishment Clause 
analysis.105  In Zorach v. Clauson,106 the Court “f[ound] no constitutional 
requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to 
religion”107 and stated that the Bill of Rights does not embody “a 
philosophy of hostility to religion.”108  Despite this lackluster lip service, 
the Court often manifests opposition toward anything with religious 
connotation.109  In the summer of 2000, the late Chief Justice Rehnquist 
acknowledged this problem when he characterized an Establishment 
Clause opinion110 as “bristl[ing] with hostility to all things religious in 
public life.”111 
One can see the inconsistency between the Court’s politically-
correct rhetoric and religiously-hostile practice by comparing the current 
Establishment tests with the pattern of recent decisions.112  For example, 
the second prong of the Lemon test condemns government action which 
“inhibits religion,”113 but the Court has never used the test to restrict the 
 
 104. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 631-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia maligned that the 
majority opinion in Lee was “conspicuously bereft of any reference to history.”  Id. at 631.  In 
response to the Court’s disregard of history and tradition, he emphasized that “our Constitution 
cannot possibly rest upon the changeable philosophical predilections of the Justices of this Court, 
but must have deep foundations in the historic practices of our people.”  Id. at 632. 
 105. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314, 315 (1952) (noting that there is “no 
constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion”); 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (noting that “the Constitution . . . forbids hostility 
toward any [religion]”). 
 106. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
 107. Id. at 314. 
 108. Id. at 315.  The Court has also recognized that hostility toward religion will bring us into 
“war with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment’s guaranty of the free exercise 
of religion.”  McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948). 
 109. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 318 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 110. See id. 
 111. Id. at 318 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  But see Lee, 505 U.S. at 598-99 (acknowledging the 
importance of religion and “precepts of morality” and claiming that the court expresses “no hostility 
to those aspirations”). 
 112. See infra notes 113-116 and accompanying text. 
 113. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
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government in such a manner.114  Likewise, the endorsement test 
theoretically denounces government “disapproval of religion,”115 but it 
has never been applied accordingly.116 
As manifest by recent decisions, it appears that the Court aspires to 
erase religion from the governmental arena.117  Current Establishment 
Clause analysis generally requires government silence regarding 
religious matters.118  Requiring such silence belittles “religious views by 
making them seem irrelevant, outdated, or even strange.”119  Demeaning 
religion conflates the religious animosity that has characterized recent 
Establishment jurisprudence.120  This ill-will toward anything religious 
 
 114. See Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: 
Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 2105, 2208 n. 616 (2003) (“[The Supreme 
Court] has never invalidated a law under the Establishment Clause on the ground that it ‘inhibits’ 
religion.”); Reka Potgieter Hoff, The Financial Accountability of Churches for Federal Income Tax 
Purposes: Establishment or Free Exercise?, 11 VA. TAX REV. 71, 136 n. 251 (1991) (noting that the 
Supreme Court has never explained the “inhibits” language of the second prong nor applied it in a 
holding); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of 
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1380-85 
(1981).  Professor Laycock believes that the “inhibition” provision of Lemon does not fit into the 
analysis.  Id.  Further, he recognizes that the Court has never applied it in one of its holdings.  Id.  
Professor Steven D. Smith believes that such inhibition of religion claims are better dealt with under 
the Free Exercise Clause.  See Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: 
Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 297-98 (1987). 
 115. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 116. See McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 10, at 152-54 (arguing that the endorsement test 
has never been applied against government disapproval of religion because the religious practice in 
question is hidden by secular practices). 
 117. See Gordon Butler, Cometh the Revolution: The Case for Overruling McCollum v. Board 
of Education, 99 DICK. L. REV. 843, 851 (1995) (“[In 1948], the Supreme Court began its effort to 
remove all traces of the Christian religion from the public school”); Michael D. Baker, Protecting 
Religious Speakers’ Access to Public School Facilities: Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches School 
District, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 326 (1993) (“In recent years, courts and educators, in 
alliance with a number of liberal interest groups, have undertaken extensive efforts to remove 
Christian ideas from the public schools.”). 
 118. Verginis, supra note 62, at 762.  An exception to government silence regarding religion 
seems to be instances of ceremonial deism.  Id. at 761.  However, the only reason that the Court 
approves of ceremonial deism is because it has lost its religious meaning through historical use.  Id.  
Thus, the Court’s requirement of silence only applies to “practices that still retain religious 
connotations.”  Id. at 762. 
 119. E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks Religiously, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1183, 
1200 (1994) (discussing the effects of religious silence by the government).  “[I]t is a fallacy to 
suppose that by omitting a subject you teach nothing about it.  On the contrary you teach that it is to 
be omitted, and that it is therefore a matter of secondary importance.”  WALTER MOBERLY, THE 
CRISIS IN THE UNIVERSITY 56 (SCM Press 1949) (arguing that religiously “neutral” education does 
not expressly reject belief in religion but rather it ignores anything religious).  Demeaning religion 
has the effect of preferring non-religion over religion.  Verginis, supra note 62, at 761.  Both the 
Lemon and endorsement tests state that the government cannot engage in such anti-religious 
activities.  See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 120. Verginis, supra note 62, at 761-62. 
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has extended from the Court to the government and from the 
government to society as a whole.121  Government silence regarding 
religion contradicts the Founders’ intent for the Establishment Clause.122  
The purpose of the Clause was to remove religion from government 
control,123 not to prevent the government from engaging in non-coercive 
religious dialogue.124  Furthermore, the Founders certainly did not intend 
the Establishment Clause to create hostility toward religious matters.125  
Rather, it was meant to prevent the religious hostility created by a 
 
 121. See 141 CONG. REC. S19, 259-60 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) 
(noting that hostility toward religion among local, state, and federal governments was spawned by 
the Court’s Religion Clause jurisprudence).  See also Shannen W. Coffin, Can I Get an Amen?, 
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, August 9, 2004, at http://www.nationalreview.com/coffin 
/coffin200408090832.asp (last visited February 12, 2005).  Not only have courts expressed hostility 
toward religion, but also the American Bar Association has engaged in a troubling attempt to 
demand that the government discriminate against the religious practices of health–care providers.  
Id.  Such actions evidence the animosity toward religion that exists throughout the many levels of 
law and politics.  See id. 
 122. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution: 
Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 933, 936-39 (1986) 
(arguing that the purpose of the Establishment Clause was to prevent an established church that 
compelled adherence) [hereinafter McConnell, Coercion]. 
 123. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310 (2000).  See Stephen L. Carter, The 
Moral Lawyer: Article: The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932, 936-37 
(1989). 
[T]here is good reason to think that “what the religion clauses of the first amendment 
were designed to do was not to remove religion and religious values from the arena of 
public debate, but to keep them there.”  The establishment clause by its terms forbids the 
imposition of religious belief by the state, not statements of religious belief in the course 
of public dialogue. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 124. See Christal L. Hoo, Thou Shalt Not Publicly Display the Ten Commandments: A Call for 
a Reevaluation of Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 683, 698 
(2004).  “The history of the Religion Clauses dispels any notion that government is forbidden from 
affirming, through language or symbol, the special status of religion in public life.”  Id.  
“Government may speak religiously, but in expressing itself, the government must avoid coercing 
compliance and using the rhetoric of orthodoxy.”  Id.  But see Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and 
Religious Schools: The New Constitutional Questions, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 221 n.185 (2003) 
(“Government may not speak religiously, teach that religion or any particular faith is true, or 
sponsor religious expression; but it may do all those things with respect to secular ideas and 
perspectives.”). 
 125. Gary C. Furst, Will the Religious Freedom Restoration Act be Strike Three Against 
Peremptory Challenges?, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 701, 738 (1996) (stating that hostility toward religion 
is entirely contrary to the intent of our nation’s Founders who sought to establish a society based 
upon the principle of religious tolerance); Andrew R. Cogar, Comment, Government Hostility to 
Religion: How Misconstruction of the Establishment Clause Stifles Religious Freedom, 105 W. VA. 
L. REV. 279, 291 (2002) (stating that Supreme Court jurisprudence has bred hostility toward 
religious expression in public forums and acknowledging that the Founders would never have 
endorsed such a result). 
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government-established religion,126 to uphold religious tolerance,127 and 
to recognize the cherished role of religion in our society by preventing 
the government from coercing religious beliefs.128 
Armed with this incoherent and hostile analytical arsenal, the Court 
faced its decision in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow. 129  
As a response to these problems with the Court’s current analysis, 
Justice O’Connor and Justice Thomas used their concurring opinions to 
present alternative approaches.130 
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM: ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL 
DISTRICT V. NEWDOW 
In Newdow, the plaintiff brought suit alleging that the school 
district’s pledge policy violated the Establishment Clause.131  The policy 
required elementary school teachers to lead willing students in a 
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.132  Based upon a novel 
interpretation of the prudential standing doctrine, the Court held that the 
 
 126. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (ruling that the use of prayer in public schools 
was unconstitutional even if students were allowed to opt out with permission from their parents).  
In Engel, the Court noted that “a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and 
to degrade religion.”  Id. at 431.  Moreover, “[t]he history of governmentally established religion, 
both in England and in this country, showed that whenever government had allied itself with one 
particular form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect[,] 
and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs.”  Id.  See also LEVY, supra note 21, at 3-5.  
The atrocities associated with established religions brewed religious animosity among nonbelievers 
because the nonbelievers associated the government actions with religion itself.  See id.  Examples 
of religious intolerance include legal punishment for preaching without government ordination and 
imposing civil disabilities on religious dissenters.  Id. 
 127. See Furst, supra note 125, at 738 (noting that religious tolerance was a principle held in 
high esteem by the Founders).  The Founders recognized that religious tolerance was a political 
necessity.  Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. 
REV. 303, 367 (1986) (discussing the unifying role of a civic culture universal to all Americans and 
central to the idea of American identity).  Such tolerance was not only a habit, but also an essential 
defense against tyranny.  Id. 
 128. See Accommodation of Religion in Public Institutions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1639, 1641-42 
(1987) (explaining that open hostility toward religion is contrary to the special status of religion in 
American society). 
 129. 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 130. See id. at 44-53 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2321-27 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 131. Id. at 5. 
 132. Id.  Due to the inclusion of the words “one nation, under God,” the plaintiff claimed that 
the Pledge constitutes religious indoctrination of his child in violation of the Establishment Clause.  
Id.  Students are not required to participate in the Pledge.  Id. A past Supreme Court decision 
requires a school board to allow “students who object on religious grounds to abstain from the 
recitation.”  See West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that a school 
board cannot require students to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance). 
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plaintiff was unable to bring suit,133 and the majority did not address the 
Establishment Clause issue.134  Nevertheless, both Justices O’Connor 
and Thomas disagreed with the majority’s holding that the plaintiff 
lacked standing.135  Thus, they authored separate concurring opinions 
addressing the merits of the case and offering their alternative analytical 
approaches to Establishment Clause jurisprudence.136 
A. Justice O’Connor’s Approach137 – Ceremonial Deism 
Justice O’Connor believes that the Establishment Clause “cannot 
easily be reduced to a single test.”138  Therefore, she wants to create a 
 
 133. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 17-18.  There are two types of standing that a plaintiff must satisfy 
in order to bring suit in the U.S. Supreme Court – Article III standing and prudential standing.  Id. at 
11-12.  Article III standing enforces the Constitution’s “case or controversy” requirement.  Id.  
Prudential standing embodies “judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.”  
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).  Although the Court has not exhaustively defined the 
dimensions of prudential standing, it encompasses “the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising 
another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more 
appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s 
complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.”  Id.  “One of the principal 
areas in which this Court has customarily declined to intervene is the realm of domestic relations” 
even if the case only involves elements of the domestic relationship.  Newdow, 542 U.S. at 12.  The 
Newdow Court held that it is “improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim by a plaintiff 
whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that are in dispute when prosecution of the 
lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the person who is the source of the plaintiff’s claimed 
standing.”  Id. at 17.  “When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to affect the outcome, the 
prudent course is for the federal court to stay its hand rather than reach out to resolve a weighty 
question of federal constitutional law.”  Id. 
 134. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 17. 
 135. See id. at 33 (O’Conner, J., concurring), 44 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 136. See id. at 33-54 (O’Conner, J., concurring), 44 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Despite the fact 
that O’Connor and Thomas disagree with the Court’s procedural holding, they concur with the 
majority’s judgment ruling because they, like the majority, reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision, 
thereby leaving the Pledge of Allegiance intact.  Id. at 42 (O’Conner, J., concurring), 53-54 
(Thomas, J., concurring).  The late Chief Justice Rehnquist also authored a concurring opinion.  Id. 
at 18-33 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  He argued that the procedural holding of the majority was 
errantly decided.  Id. at 16-30.  When he reaches the merits of the case, his argument is based 
primarily on tradition and distinguishing the precedent set by Lee v. Weisman.  Id. at 31-33.  He 
does not pose a new approach to Establishment Clause analysis, and thus his opinion is not relevant 
for purposes of this article.  Id. 
 137. See Peter L. Giunta, Unequalled Among Firsts, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2079, 2082 (2004) 
(reviewing Kenneth W. Starr’s book First Among Equals: The Supreme Court in American Life).  
Kenneth W. Starr refers to O’Connor as a “common-law constitutionalist.”  Id.  O’Connor is a 
moderate in both her social policy and judicial philosophy.  Id.  Nevertheless, she is “ready and 
willing to create new law.”  Id.  Her views are often decisive in determining the outcome of the 
Court’s decision.  Id. 
 138. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 33 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  When facing a challenge to 
government-sponsored speech, Justice O’Connor prefers the endorsement test.  Id. 
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new test for a small category of cases involving “ceremonial deism.”139  
It is important to understand that the ceremonial deism standard only 
applies to a subset of particular cases; it does not replace the other tests 
or create an entirely new analytical approach.140  Ceremonial deism 
identifies limited instances where the government may commemorate 
religion in the public setting.141  According to O’Connor, such 
expressions are not minor infringements on the Establishment Clause 
that the Court chooses to ignore.142  Rather, the character, history, and 
context of such religious expressions prevent them from violating the 
Establishment Clause at all.143  The rationale for this conclusion is that 
such religious utterances have traded their religious meaning for a 
secular purpose.144  Permissible secular purposes include “solemnizing 
 
 139. Id. at 42. 
 140. See id. at 33.  The ceremonial deism test is a “specific application of the endorsement test 
[which] examin[es] whether the ceremony or representation would convey a message to a 
reasonable observer, familiar with its history, origins, and context, that those who do not adhere to 
its literal message are political outsiders.”  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
According to O’Connor, expressions of ceremonial deism not only satisfy the endorsement test, but 
they also pass analysis under the psychological coercion test.  See Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 44 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
Any coercion that persuades an onlooker to participate in an act of ceremonial deism is 
inconsequential, as an Establishment Clause matter, because such acts are simply not 
religious in character.  As a result, symbolic references to religion that qualify as 
instances of ceremonial deism will pass the coercion test as well as the endorsement test. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 141. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 35.  See, e.g., Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 
515 U.S. 753 (1995) (involving a private, unattended display of a cross in a public forum opened by 
the government for private expression); Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (involving a display of a crèche on 
the staircase of a government courthouse and a menorah outside a government building); Lynch, 465 
U.S. 668 (1984) (involving a city’s Christmas display which included a crèche); Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (discussing the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer).  
Other examples of ceremonial deism include symbols, city seals, songs, mottos, and oaths.  
Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2322 (O’Conner, J., concurring).  Specific examples include our national 
motto (“In God We Trust”), religious references in the Star-Spangled Banner, and the words with 
which the Supreme Court Marshal opens each session (“God save the United States and this 
honorable Court”).  Id. at 2323. 
 142. Newdow, 542 U.S. at  (O’Conner, J., concurring).  
 143. Id.  Contra Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 2083 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court can and should declare that most 
forms of ceremonial deism are unconstitutional); Charles Gregory Warren, No Need to Stand on 
Ceremony: The Corruptive Influence of Ceremonial Deism and the Need for a Separationist 
Reconfiguration of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 54 MERCER L. REV. 
1669 (2003) (critiquing the Court’s resort to secularization and ceremonial deism in fashioning its 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence). 
 144. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 36-37 (O’Conner, J., concurring).  “The constitutional value of 
ceremonial deism turns on a shared understanding of its legitimate nonreligious purposes.”  Id.  
Historical use can strip an expression of its original religious purpose.  Id. at 40.  “An act of 
ceremonial deism is inconsequential, as an Establishment Clause matter, because such acts are 
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public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging 
the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society.”145  
O’Connor also recognizes the important secular purpose of 
commemorating America’s religious history.146  She believes that such 
religious references can serve to solemnize an occasion without 
“invok[ing] divine provenance.”147 
Justice O’Connor highlights four factors to help determine whether 
a particular religious expression qualifies as ceremonial deism.148  First, 
the expression must have been in place for a significant portion of our 
Nation’s history and must have been practiced by enough people to 
classify it as ubiquitous.149  O’Connor is careful to point out that history 
does not insulate a violation of the Establishment Clause, but “an 
unbroken practice . . . is not something to be lightly cast aside.”150  
Second, the expression must not involve prayer or worship.151  
According to O’Connor, situations where prayer is regarded as 
 
simply not religious in character.  Id. at 44 (emphasis in original). 
 145. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692-93 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 146. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 35 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Since our nation was founded on 
religious principles by a group of religious refugees, these same principles will be manifest in our 
national traditions.  Id.  “Eradicating such references would sever ties to a history that sustains [our] 
Nation even today.”  Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 33-43.  Steven B. Epstein has identified other characteristics of ceremonial deism.  
See Epstein, supra note 143, at 2095.  Other main attributes of ceremonial deism include 
unlikelihood of indoctrinating the audience and a reference to a generic deity.  Id.  Other incidental 
characteristics include the fact that ceremonial deism is created, delivered, or encouraged by 
government officials, it occurs during governmental events, and it is not specifically designed to 
further the free exercise of religion.  Id. 
 149. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 35 (O’Conner, J., concurring).  Ubiquitous is defined as something 
that is constantly encountered or widespread.  MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, available 
at http://www.m-w.com/cgibin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=ubiquitous (last visited November 
13, 2004).  A common reference to religion – such as “In God We Trust” on U.S. currency or 
“under God” in the Pledge – is likely to be viewed as ceremonial deism.  Newdow, 542 U.S. at 37 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  One obvious ramification of the historical use requirement is that “only 
the ceremonial deisms that already exist may ever exist because any new religious practices that the 
government attempts to institute will not have the necessary longevity to constitute ceremonial 
deism.”  Verginis, supra note 62, at 761. 
 150. Newdow, 542 U.S. 38 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of the 
City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970)).  The history of a practice is even more significant 
when it has not generated significant controversy during the course of its use.  Newdow, 542 U.S. at  
38-39 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Even if a religious expression was originally adopted for the 
purpose of advancing religion, this improper motivation can be cured by a historical use that has 
stripped the expression of its original purpose.  Id.  
 151. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 39-40 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  “Any statement that has as its 
purpose placing the speaker or listener in a penitent state of mind, or that is intended to create a 
spiritual communion or invoke divine aid, strays from the legitimate secular purposes of 
solemnizing an event and recognizing a shared religious history.”  Id. at 40. 
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ceremonial deism are exceedingly rare.152  Third, the expression must 
not prefer a particular religious sect over another.153  Finally, the 
expression must include minimal religious content.154  Applying 
O’Connor’s ceremonial deism analysis, the Pledge of Allegiance does 
not violate the Establishment Clause.155  Other prominent examples of 
ceremonial deism include legislative prayer, the national motto “In God 
We Trust,” and invoking the name of God in a Presidential address.156 
The phrase “ceremonial deism” originated in a 1962 lecture given 
by former Yale Law School Dean Walter Rostow.157  He characterized 
ceremonial deism as a “class of public activity, which could be accepted 
as so conventional and uncontroversial as to be constitutional.”158  
Despite generating some discussion amongst scholars, the phrase 
 
 152. Id.  The only example cited by Justice O’Connor is the upholding of legislative prayer in 
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).  See id. (O’Connor, J., concurring).  The rationale for 
upholding legislative prayer was its “extremely long and unambiguous history.”  Id.  See also 
Ashley M. Bell, “God Save This Honorable Court”: How Current Establishment Clause 
Jurisprudence Can be Reconciled with the Secularization of Historical Religious Expressions, 50 
AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1306-07 (2001) (noting that legislative prayer in Marsh was found to be 
constitutional because the Court determined that it was a mere “acknowledgement[] of religion 
based on history and tradition”).  On the other hand, the Supreme Court has rejected the 
constitutionality of other forms of public prayer.  See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) 
(holding that prayer at a public school graduation is a violation of the Establishment Clause); Engel 
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that the use of prayer in public schools is unconstitutional). 
 153. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 42 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  “The clearest command of the 
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over 
another.”  Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).  Justice O’Connor recognizes that some 
religions, such as Buddhism, do not believe in a separate Supreme Being.  Newdow, 542 U.S. at 42 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  Her response is that it would be impossible to develop a “brief 
solemnizing reference to religion” that would adequately represent the religious beliefs of every 
American.  Id.  Thus a generic reference to God is a sufficient attempt to acknowledge religion 
without favoring a specific belief.  Id. 
 154. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 40 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  A ceremony cannot bypass the 
mandates of the Establishment Clause by avoiding a reference to God.  See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S. 38 (1985) (statute establishing a moment of silence for meditation or prayer violated the 
Establishment Clause).  A minimal amount of religious content is important for three reasons.  
Newdow, 542 U.S. at 42-43 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  First, it supports the fact that the expression 
is being used to solemnize the event and not to promote religion.  Id.  Second, it makes it easier for 
nonbelievers to opt out.  Id.  Third, it limits the government’s opportunity to prefer one religion over 
another.  Id. 
 155. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at  43 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 156. Epstein, supra note 143, at 2095.  Other examples of ceremonial deism include the 
Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays, oaths of public officers, oaths of participants in judicial 
proceedings, the invocation “God save the United States and this Honorable Court” prior to judicial 
proceedings, the use of “in the year of our Lord” to date public documents, religious symbols in 
government seals, and the National Day of Prayer.  Id. at 2095-96. 
 157. See id. at 2091. 
 158. Arthur E. Sutherland, Book Review, 40 IND. L.J. 83, 86 (1964) (reviewing WILBER G. 
KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1963)). 
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“ceremonial deism” has only been used by the Supreme Court in three 
cases.159  Nevertheless, the Court has “implicitly referred to this concept 
from the very beginning of its Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”160 
The Court’s opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly161 provides constitutional 
protection for ceremonial deism.162  Chief Justice Burger held that the 
inclusion of a crèche in a government holiday display did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.163  In support of this holding, he emphasized the 
importance of our Nation’s “unbroken history of official 
acknowledgment . . . of the role of religion”164 and the fact that “our 
history is replete with official references to the value and invocation of 
Divine guidance in deliberations and pronouncements of the Founding 
Fathers and contemporary leaders.”165  This history and tradition–based 
rationale provides precedent with which to defend ceremonial deism 
from constitutional attack.  O’Connor’s view of ceremonial deism 
emanates from many of the ideas expressed in the Lynch opinion.166 
 
 159. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I would suggest that such practices 
as the designation of “In God We Trust” as our national motto, or the references to God contained in 
the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag can best be understood, in Dean Rostow’s apt phrase, as a form 
a ‘ceremonial deism,’ . . . .”); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[C]eremonial 
deism do[es] not survive Establishment Clause scrutiny simply by virtue of their historical longevity 
alone.”); Newdow, 542 U.S. at 37 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“This category of ‘ceremonial deism’ 
most clearly encompasses such things as the national motto . . . , religious references in traditional 
patriotic songs such as the Star-Spangled Banner, and the words with which the Marshal of this 
Court opens each of its sessions . . . .”). 
 160. Epstein, supra note 143, at 2093.  An example of an implicit reference to ceremonial 
deism is found in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-313 (1952).  In discussing the futility of 
complete separation between church and state, Justice Douglas cites examples of references to God 
that do not violate the Establishment Clause.  Id.  “Prayers in our legislative halls; the appeals to the 
Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a 
holiday; ‘so help me God’ in our courtroom oaths – these and all other references to the Almighty 
that run through our laws, our public rituals, [and] our ceremonies” do not violate the Establishment 
Clause.  Id. 
 161. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 162. Epstein, supra note 143, at 2094. 
 163. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687. 
 164. Id. at 674. 
 165. Id. at 675. 
 166. Compare Newdow, 542 U.S. at 35 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing instances where the 
government may refer to religion in public life and stating that the Court should not deny that our 
religious history “has left its mark on our national traditions”), with Lynch, 465 U.S. at 674-77 
(noting examples of traditional government expressions of religion which have been protected under 
the Establishment Clause, including the national motto and the Pledge of Allegiance, and stating 
that “our history is pervaded by expressions of religious beliefs”). 
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B. Justice Thomas’s Approach167 – Actual Legal Coercion 
Like O’Connor, Thomas agreed that the plaintiff had adequate 
standing to bring his suit, and as a result, he addressed the merits of the 
case.168  Unlike O’Connor, however, Thomas perceives an inherent 
problem with Establishment jurisprudence as a whole, which leads him 
to critique the Court’s current approach and posit an overall solution.169 
There are two parts to Thomas’s solution.170  First, he believes that 
the incorporation of the Establishment Clause is incorrect.171  He views 
the Establishment Clause as a federalism provision,172 and as such, it 
should not be applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.173  He 
 
 167. See MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED 89 (2005).  Justice Thomas interprets the 
Constitution adopted in 1789 without emphasizing the post-Civil War Amendments.  Id.  Thomas’s 
interpretation uses a “rigorously originalist method, but with a twist.”  Id.  The twist consists of his 
reading of the Constitution against its background in natural law.  Id. 
 168. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 44-53 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 169. See id. at 44. 
 170. See id. at 49-53. 
 171. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 49(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing against the incorporation of 
the Establishment Clause); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678-80 (2002) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the Establishment Clause does not qualify for incorporation through the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  See also William P. Gray, Jr., The Ten Commandments and the Ten 
Amendments: A Case Study in Religious Freedom in Alabama, 49 ALA. L. REV. 509, 531 (1998) 
(arguing that incorporation of the Establishment Clause was incorrect).  Under “selective 
incorporation,” the Court enforced many guarantees found in the Bill of Rights against the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent State 
Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. 
REV. 977, 979 (1985).  See, e.g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970) (collateral estoppel); 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969) (double jeopardy); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 
U.S. 213, 222 (1967) (speedy trial); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (self-incrimination); 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
655 (1961) (unreasonable search and seizure); Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (cruel 
and unusual punishment); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (free exercise of 
religion); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937) (assembly); Near v. Olson, 283 U.S. 
697, 707 (1931) (freedoms of speech and press); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931) 
(freedom of speech); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (freedoms of speech and 
press).  Specifically, the Establishment Clause was incorporated in 1947.  See Everson v. Board of 
Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). 
 172. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 642 (8th ed. 1990).  Federalism relates to a system of 
associated governments with a vertical division of governments into national and regional 
components having different responsibilities.  Id. 
 173. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring).  The Fourteenth Amendment provides 
that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect individuals 
from the state, not protect the states from the federal government.  Newdow, 542 U.S. at 49 
(Thomas, J., concurring).  But see Michael Kent Curtis, John Bingham and the Meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: John A. Bingham and the Story of American Liberty: The Lost Cause Meets 
the “Lost Clause”, 36 AKRON L. REV. 617, 623 (2003) (recounting the life of John Bingham in the 
context of America’s struggle for liberty).  Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan, who introduced the 
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acknowledges two purposes of the Establishment Clause.174  The first is 
to “prohibit[] Congress from establishing a national religion.”175  The 
second purpose seeks to uphold federalism and protect states’ rights by 
preventing congressional interference with state establishments of 
religion.176  Conversely, the Fourteenth Amendment only protects 
individual rights against infringement by state governments.177  Since 
neither purpose for the Establishment Clause seeks to protect individual 
rights,178 the Establishment Clause does not qualify for incorporation.179  
This portion of Thomas’s view has been ridiculed by many scholars 
despite its apparent validity from an originalist and textualist 
perspective.180 
 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Senate, “clearly said that the Amendment’s ‘privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States’ included the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.”  Id. 
 174. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  The Fourteenth Amendment states: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Id.  The language of the Fourteenth Amendment, which focuses on a person’s privileges, 
immunities, life, liberty, and property, is concerned with upholding individual rights.  See id. 
 178. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 49-50 (Thomas, J., concurring).  The Founders inserted the Free 
Exercise Clause to “protect individuals against congressional interference with the right to exercise 
their religion.”  Id.  The Free Exercise Clause is found in the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  It states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Thomas 
concedes that there is an argument that the Establishment Clause protects individual rights.  
Newdow, 542 U.S. at 50 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Specifically, it is the right to be free from 
coercive federal establishments.  Id.  This argument provides minimal support for the incorporation 
of the Establishment Clause.  Id. 
 179. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 50.  But see Richard Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 66-78 (1993) (arguing that history supports the argument 
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to incorporate 
the Bill of Rights against the states). 
 180. See Brian Leiter, The U.S. Supreme Court Dodges a Bullet, THE LEITER REPORTS: 
EDITORIALS, NEWS, UPDATES, http://webapp.utexas.edu/blogs/archives/bleiter/001452.html (last 
visited June 15, 2004).  Professor Brian Leiter said, “Thomas . . . solidif[ied] his status on the 
lunatic fringe [by] argu[ing] that the Establishment Clause shouldn’t even apply to the states.”  Id.  
A majority of scholars and members of the Supreme Court will not even consider Thomas’s 
“unincorporation” argument.  See, e.g., Lash, supra note 17, at 1086-87 (stating that the original 
intent argument against the incorporation of the Establishment Clause is fundamentally flawed and 
thus cannot be seriously considered).  Nevertheless, many well–reasoned articles argue against the 
incorporation of the Establishment Clause.  See, e.g., William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the 
Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191 
(1990) (arguing against the incorporation of the Establishment Clause); Rethinking the 
Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1700 (1992) 
(considering the implications of “unincorporating” the Establishment Clause) [hereinafter 
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In the second portion of Thomas’s opinion, he suggests that the 
“actual legal coercion test” should be used to replace the multi–test 
approach.181  Under this approach, government action seeking to coerce 
religious orthodoxy or financial support “by force of law and threat of 
penalty” violates the Establishment Clause.182  It renders the other tests 
superfluous because it captures the essential purpose of the 
Establishment Clause.183  According to Thomas, the government only 
violates the Constitution when it uses legal means to directly coerce 
religious beliefs.184  Examples of such legal coercion include mandatory 
church attendance or taxation to fund a particular church’s operations.185  
 
Rethinking Incorporation]; Jonathan P. Brose, In Birmingham They Love the Governor: Why the 
Fourteenth Amendment Does Not Incorporate the Establishment Clause, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1 
(1998) (arguing that the incorporation of the Establishment Clause was incorrect); Gray, supra note 
171.  The Supreme Court’s rationale for the incorporation of the Establishment Clause is extremely 
sparse.  See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp.v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 254-58 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
concurring).  When the Supreme Court originally incorporated the Establishment Clause, Justice 
Black failed to provide any rationale.  See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.  Over fifteen years later in 
Schempp, Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion offered support for the Establishment Clause’s 
incorporation.  See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 254-258 (Brennan, J., concurring).  However, Brennan’s 
cursory analysis of the argument was unconvincing.  See Rethinking Incorporation, supra note 180, 
at 1709-11.  Due to the unlikelihood of “unincorporation” by the Supreme Court, this article will 
focus on the second portion of Thomas’s solution as providing necessary renovation to 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
 181. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 52 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 182. Id. (emphasis in the original) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting)).  In order to understand the basis of Thomas’s view, one must consider the role of 
government-established religion in England and the Colonies during the founding of America.  See 
Lee, 505 U.S. at 640-641 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Typically, attendance at the state church was required; only clergy of the official church 
could lawfully perform sacraments; and dissenters, if tolerated, faced an array of civil 
disabilities.  Thus, for example, in the Colony of Virginia, where the Church of England 
had been established, ministers were required by law to conform to the doctrine and rites 
of the Church of England; and all persons were required to attend church and observe the 
Sabbath, were tithed for the public support of Anglican ministers, and were taxed for the 
costs of building and repairing churches. 
Lee, 505 U.S. at 640-641 (citations omitted).  One year following the Newdow case, Justice Thomas 
echoed his “actual legal coercion” approach in Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2865 (2005) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the “Framers understood an establishment ‘necessarily [to] 
involve actual legal coercion’”). 
 183. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 52 (Thomas, J., concurring) (The type of coercion which 
characterizes this test is the same “coercion that was a hallmark of historical establishments of 
religion”). 
 184. Id. at 51-52. 
 185. Id.  Thomas seems to leave open the question of whether support for religion generally 
through taxation violates the Establishment Clause.  Id.  There is an argument that the Founders 
would have found no Establishment Clause violation if the government taxes its citizens to support 
religion in general, as long as the government does not prefer one religion over another when 
distributing the funds.  See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Religion and the Public Schools After Lee v. 
Weisman: Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 863 n.211 (1993).  Taxation does not 
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This approach also recognizes that the government may not instill a 
religion with governmental authority186 nor may it “delegate its civic 
authority to a group chosen according to a religious criterion.”187  
Finally, Thomas believes that a government must refrain from giving 
preference to a particular religious faith.188  Specifically, he believes that 
“[l]egal compulsion is an inherent component of ‘preferences’ in this 
context.”189 
 
amount to direct coerced support for religion where religion is simply permitted to benefit from a 
neutral government program of general applicability on the same terms as secular beneficiaries.  Id.  
Coerced financial support as understood by the Founders “requires at least some sort of government 
preferential funding of religion; it is disparate distribution, not the fact of taxation, that might tend 
to be coercive.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  According to Professor Paulsen, “[r]eligion may receive 
financial benefits, but there must exist some non-pretextual general category or rule of inclusion that 
embraces religious beneficiaries [and] is capable of being expressed in non-religious terms.”  Id.  
But see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968) (“[American] history vividly illustrates that one of 
the specific evils feared by those who drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption 
was that the taxing and spending power would be used to favor one religion over another or to 
support religion in general.”).  A taxation scheme that benefits religion in general would be akin to 
the current system of taxation for public schooling.  Public education fosters a social benefit by 
producing educated and competent citizens.  See Linda C. McClain, Symposium The Constitution 
and the Good Society: The Domain of Civic Virtue in a Good Society: Families, Schools, and Sex 
Equality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1617, 1654 (2001) (noting that the development of competent 
citizens and the inculcation of fundamental values are some of the social benefits of a public 
education).  Likewise, religion is considered to foster a social benefit because it generally 
encourages morality among its citizens.  See George Washington, Farewell Address (September 17, 
1796), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/washing.htm (last visited October 25, 2005) 
(stating that “reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in 
exclusion of religious principle”). 
 186. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 52  (Thomas, J., concurring).  A religious organization which carries 
government authority that can be used coercively resembles a traditional “religious establishment.”  
Id. 
 187. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 698 (1994) 
(ruling that a state government cannot create a separate school district for a village containing 
practitioners of a strict form of Judaism). 
 188. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 52 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Thomas believes that the government 
is not forbidden from giving preferences for religion over irreligion.  Rosenberger v. Rectors and 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 855 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).  Rather, the 
government is only prohibited from giving preferences for particular religious faiths over others.  Id.  
See also Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2860 n.3 (containing a statement by a four-justice plurality that 
they do not “adhere to the principle that the Establishment Clause bars any and all governmental 
preference for religion over irreligion”); McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 
2751-52 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the government may act in a way that improves 
the position of religion). 
 189. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 52 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Thomas acknowledges that James 
Madison commended the no-preference argument.  Id.  Specifically, Madison’s Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments expounds this view.  Id.  The Remonstrance was 
written in response to a bill of the Virginia legislature entitled “A Bill establishing a provision for 
Teachers of the Christian Religion.”  Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 15, 63-64 (appendix to 
dissent of Rutledge, J.).  Thus, the arguments found in Madison’s Remonstrance are premised upon 
coercive taxation used to support an established religion.  Newdow, 542 U.S. at 52-54 (Thomas, J., 
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According to Thomas, the purpose for the enactment of the 
Establishment Clause was to prevent “one powerful sect or combination 
of sects [from] us[ing] political or governmental power to punish 
dissenters whom they could not convert to their faith.”190  Thus, any 
government action which does not punish religious dissenters by use of 
legal force, create a coercive government establishment, or give legal 
preference to a religious group cannot be said to violate the 
Establishment Clause.191 
Past judicial opinions and scholarly writings supporting the actual 
legal coercion test are limited.192  Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lee v. 
Weisman provides the first exposition of this approach.193  Scalia’s 
argument focuses on the Founders’ intent as well as the history and 
tradition of our Nation.194  Contrasting the actual legal coercion test with 
the “psychological coercion test,” he sees no reason to “expand[] the 
concept of coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty.”195  
Further, he recognizes that speech, of its very nature, “is not coercive; 
the listener may do as he likes.”196  Thus, the government must engage in 
 
concurring).  See generally Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 853-56 (1947) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(discussing the Assessment Controversy and arguing that Madison believed the Establishment 
Clause forbids government preferences for some religious faiths over others, not government 
preferences for religion over irreligion). 
 190. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 319 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 191. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 53 (Thomas, J., concurring).  “It may well be the case that anything 
that would violate the incorporated Establishment Clause would actually violate the Free Exercise 
Clause, further calling into doubt the utility of incorporating the Establishment Clause.”  Id. 
 192. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 631-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Johnson, supra note 10, at 178-
94. 
 193. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 631-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 194. See id. at 640-642.  Scalia grounds his interpretation of “coercion” in the history of 
Colonial and Revolutionary America.  Id. at 641.  Moreover, a nonsectarian invocation and 
benediction is “so characteristically American [that it] could have come from the pen of George 
Washington or Abraham Lincoln himself.”  Id.  Throughout our nation’s history, these kinds of 
public prayers have become commonplace.  Id. at 633-634.  George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, 
James Madison, and George Bush all prayed during their inaugural address.  Id.  Most Presidents 
have delivered Thanksgiving Proclamations with their prayerful gratitude to God.  Id. at 635.  
Likewise, both the legislative and judicial branches have recognized prayer during public events.  
Id. 
 195. Id. at 642.  Scalia feels that the psychological coercion test is unworkable for judges who 
have no expertise in the field of psychology.  Id.  On the other hand, actual legal coercion is “readily 
discernible to [judges] who have made a career of reading the disciples of Blackstone rather than of 
Freud.”  Id.  See also Newdow, 542 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Thomas believes that the 
notion of coercion embraced by the Court in Lee has “no basis in law or reason.”  Id.  “Peer 
pressure, unpleasant as it may be, is not coercion.”  Id.  Instead, “[t]he kind of coercion implicated 
by the Religion Clauses is that accomplished ‘by force of law and threat of penalty.’”  Id. (emphasis 
in original). 
 196. Lee, 505 U.S. at 642 (quoting American Jewish Congress v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 132 
(7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)).  Scalia’s view that speech, at least in the manner of 
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something more than speech to coerce; there must be some 
governmental authority enforcing action or exacting penalties.197  
Judicial analysis, under the direct legal coercion test, “focus[es] on the 
actual effects of governmental power and not on mere appearances.”198 
Thomas’s actual legal coercion test is the preferred solution to the 
Establishment Clause problem.199  Ceremonial deism only addresses a 
small category of Establishment cases while leaving the remainder of the 
doctrine in disarray.200  The underlying rationale of O’Connor’s 
approach degrades the importance of religion – an importance which has 
been recognized throughout our Nation’s history.201  Ceremonial deism 
is a meager patch on Establishment Clause jurisprudence.202  With time, 
this patch will erode and expose the analytical hole lurking beneath.203  
On the other hand, Thomas’s test retains a proper respect for the role of 
religion in our society, strikes at the heart of Establishment Clause 
analysis, and is an effective replacement for the Court’s incoherent 
scheme.204 
V. INADEQUACIES OF CEREMONIAL DEISM 
A. Ceremonial Deism Illustrates and Ignores the Flaws in the Court’s 
Current Analysis 
Expressions of ceremonial deism are unconstitutional under the 
Court’s current Establishment Clause analysis.205  Consider the Pledge 
 
nonsectarian prayer, does not coerce is based on the Founders’ approval of nonsectarian prayer at 
public events.  Lee, 505 U.S. at 642. 
 197. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 144.  But see Lee, 505 U.S. at 593-96 (arguing that 
government speech which creates public pressure and peer pressure to engage in a religious exercise 
amounts to improper coercion protected by the Establishment Clause). 
 198. Johnson, supra note 10, at 178-179. 
 199. See infra notes 250-318 and accompanying text. 
 200. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 33 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Ceremonial deism is a specific 
application of the endorsement test.  Id.  It does not address the problems with the Lemon and 
psychological coercion tests; in fact, the addition of the ceremonial deism standard adds more 
confusion to the current system.  See infra notes 205-221 and accompanying text. 
 201. See McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 10, at 152-153 (demonstrating the bias against 
religion that is inherent in the endorsement test). 
 202. See infra notes 205-249 and accompanying text. 
 203. See infra notes 205-249 and accompanying text. 
 204. See infra notes 250-318 and accompanying text. 
 205. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  “Few of our traditional 
practices recognizing the part religion plays in our society can withstand scrutiny under a faithful 
application of [the endorsement test].”  Id.  Justice Kennedy cites a few examples of historical 
practices that will be declared unconstitutional under the endorsement test, including the statute 
authorizing a National Day of Prayer, the Pledge of Allegiance, the national motto, and legislative 
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of Allegiance as an example.  Regardless of which test the Court applies, 
the Pledge will be found unconstitutional.206  According to Justice 
Thomas, the Court will decide this issue under the psychological or 
indirect coercion test and conclude that the Pledge violates the 
Establishment Clause.207  If, however, the Court chooses to apply the 
Lemon test, it will likewise find the Pledge unconstitutional.208  The 
Pledge might satisfy the secular purpose prong by “foster[ing] national 
unity and pride in [American] principles.”209  Nevertheless, the inclusion 
of the words “under God” in the Pledge suggests that an essential 
element of patriotism includes proclaiming “the dedication of our Nation 
and our people to the Almighty.”210  Such a “religious affirmation” 
 
prayer.  Id. at 672-73.  See also Epstein, supra note 143, at 2091 (stating that the “Supreme Court 
can and should hold most forms of ceremonial deism to be unconstitutional”). 
 206. See Respondent’s Brief at 5, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) 
(No. 02-1624) (arguing that the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance violates every 
Establishment Clause test that the Supreme Court has announced).  Usually, the Court’s choice of 
which test to apply is a critical issue in the analysis.  Id. at 8.  However, in dealing with the Pledge, 
the choice is of little consequence because every test leads to the conclusion that the Pledge violates 
the Establishment Clause.  Id.  But see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).  If the Court uses a 
history and tradition-based analysis similar to that found in Marsh, the Pledge of Allegiance might 
be found constitutionally valid.  See id. 
 207. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 45-48 (Thomas, J., concurring).  “Adherence to [the 
psychological coercion test] in Lee would require [the Court] to strike down the Pledge policy, 
which, in most respects, poses more serious difficulties than the prayer at issue in Lee.”  Id. at 46.  
First, students are legally compelled to attend school and thus are required to be present at the 
morning Pledge routine.  Id.  Second, students who wish to dissent will often participate anyways 
due to coercion from peers.  Id. at 47.  See also Brief of Amicus Curae Religious Scholars and 
Theologians in Support of Respondent at 5, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 
2301 (2004) (No. 02-1624) [hereinafter Brief of Religious Scholars] (arguing that the Pledge of 
Allegiance is unconstitutional under a proper application of Lee v. Weisman).  But see Newdow, 124 
S. Ct. 2319-20 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing that the phrase “under God” in the Pledge does 
not convert its recital into a “religious exercise” of the sort described in Lee and thus upholding the 
Pledge as a matter of precedent). 
 208. See Respondent’s Brief at 12-15, Newdow (No. 02-1624) (arguing that the Pledge violates 
the Lemon test).  The inclusion of the words “under God” violates the secular purpose requirement 
because these words were added in order to distinguish the U.S. from Communist Russia by 
endorsing monotheism and disapproving atheism.  Id. at 13.  Moreover, “[a] group ‘expression of 
faith’ – obviously in ‘God’ – has religious effects, and violates Lemon’s second prong.”  Id. at 15. 
 209. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 5.  Justice O’Connor acknowledges other secular purposes such as 
“solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition 
of what is worthy of appreciation in society.”  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
Another important secular purpose is seeking to commemorate the religion of our nation’s history.  
Newdow, 542 U.S. at 37  (O’Connor, J., concurring).  But see Respondent’s Brief at 13-14, Newdow 
(No. 02-1624) (arguing that the purpose prong of the Lemon test is violated because the 
congressional record indicates that Congress inserted the words “under God” into the Pledge for the 
purpose of acknowledging the dependence of America upon the moral directions of the Creator). 
 210. 100 CONG. REC. 8617 (1954) (quoting President Eisenhower at the signing of the joint 
resolution which placed the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance).  On June 14, 1954, the 
words “under God” were added to the Pledge of Allegiance.  Brief of Religious Scholars at 3, 
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causes the Pledge to violate both the “neither advances nor inhibits” 
prong and the “excessive entanglement” prong of the Lemon test.211  
Finally, under a generic application of the endorsement test, the words 
“under God” prefer monotheistic beliefs over pantheistic or atheistic 
beliefs, thus improperly endorsing a subset of religions.212 
The fact that the Pledge of Allegiance, as well as other historically 
practiced expressions of ceremonial deism, should be declared 
unconstitutional illustrates a problem with current Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.213  The Court has consistently emphasized the role of 
history and tradition in Establishment Clause analysis.214  “The more 
 
Newdow (No. 02-1624).  Congress made this change in response to the Cold War and in defiance of 
“godless Communism.”  Id. at 5.  These words were added to commemorate the traditional concept 
that America was founded on a fundamental belief in God.  H.R. Rep. No. 1693, 83d Cong., 2d 
Sess., p 2 (1954).  In essence, Congress “incorporate[ed] – as an official element of patriotism – an 
affirmation of a belief in ‘God’ and loyalty to the ideal of a nation defined by religious devotion.”  
Brief of Religious Scholars at 5, Newdow (No. 02-1624). 
 211. Brief of Religious Scholars at 5, Newdow (No. 02-1624).  The Pledge is an expression of 
personal belief.  Id.  “[T]he campaign to add ‘under God’ to the Pledge was infused with a sectarian 
religious purpose.”  Id. at 12.  This religious purpose created an endorsement of a particular 
religious doctrine.  Id. at 13.  Wholly apart from its purpose, the inclusion of “under God” makes 
the Pledge “an affirmation of religion and an expression of religious belief.”  Id. 
 212. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 672-73 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  In assessing the 
constitutionality of the Pledge under the endorsement test, Justice Kennedy states that “it borders on 
sophistry to suggest that the ‘reasonable’ atheist would not feel less than a ‘full member[ ] of the 
political community’ every time his fellow Americans recited, as part of their expression of 
patriotism and love for country, a phrase he believed to be false.”  Id.  Not surprisingly, Michael 
Newdow is a self-proclaimed atheist.  Newdow,  542 U.S. at 5.  See also Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Associated Pantheistic Groups at 12, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) 
(No. 02-1624) [hereinafter Brief of Pantheistic Groups] (arguing that “the phrase ‘under God’ 
conflicts, at a minimum, with the religious viewpoints of polytheistic religions such as Hinduism or 
paganism, of non-theistic religions such as Buddhism or pantheism, as well as of the religious 
positions of atheism and humanism”).  Pantheism is characterized by the absence of a “God.”  Id.  
Thus, the recitation that America is “under” a deity directly conflicts with the beliefs of Pantheists.  
Id. at 13.  According to Justice O’Connor, since the endorsement test takes the perspective of a 
“reasonable observer,” the history and ubiquity of the activity will detract from its religious 
meaning.  Newdow, 542 U.S. at 35 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 213. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
[T]he meaning of the [Establishment] Clause is to be determined by reference to 
historical practices and understandings.  Whatever test we choose to apply must permit 
not only legitimate practices two centuries old but also any other practices with no 
greater potential for an establishment of religion.  The First Amendment is a rule, not a 
digest or compendium.  A test for implementing the protections of the Establishment 
Clause that, if applied with consistency, would invalidate longstanding traditions cannot 
be a proper reading of the Clause. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 214. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678.  The Court has consistently refused “to construe the Religion 
Clauses with a literalness that would undermine the ultimate constitutional objective as illuminated 
by history.”  Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970) (emphasis 
in original)).  See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 669 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that “the 
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longstanding and widely accepted a practice, the greater its impact upon 
constitutional interpretation”215 and the more likely it is to be found 
constitutional.216  Yet despite their historical significance and unbroken 
practice, instances of ceremonial deism will be found unconstitutional 
under any faithful application of the current Establishment Clause 
tests.217  In order to avoid “invalidat[ing] scores of traditional practices 
which recogniz[e] the place religion holds in our culture,”218 current 
Establishment Clause analysis “must be twisted and stretched to avoid 
inconsistency with practices we know to have been permitted in the 
past.”219  Justice O’Connor’s ceremonial deism approach seeks to erase 
these aberrational results by creating an additional Establishment Clause 
test.220  Rather than creating another extremely limited test, the Court 
should seek to identify and correct the analytical problems creating such 
counterintuitive results.221 
 
meaning of the [Establishment] Clause is to be determined by reference to historical practices and 
understandings”); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 (noting that “historical evidence sheds light not only on 
what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that 
Clause applied [in] practice”); Walz, 397 U.S. at 678 (noting that “an unbroken practice . . . is not 
something to be lightly cast aside”); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp.v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The line we must draw between the permissible and the 
impermissible is one which accords with history.”). 
 215. Walz, 397 U.S. at 681 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 216. See, e.g., Walz, 397 U.S. 664 (holding that the granting of tax-exemptions, which had 
been allowed for two centuries, does not violate the Establishment Clause); Marsh, 463 U.S. 783 
(holding that legislative prayer, which had been practiced since the beginning of our nation’s 
history, does not violate the Establishment Clause); Lynch, 465 U.S. 668 (holding that the inclusion 
of a crèche in a town Christmas display, which had been erected for over forty years without 
causing controversy, did not violate the Establishment Clause). 
 217. See infra notes 205-212 and accompanying text. 
 218. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 219. Id.  In support of his contention that strict application of the endorsement test will 
invalidate many traditional practices, Justice Kennedy notes that “Presidential proclamations of 
days of Thanksgiving, congressional chaplains, the national motto, ‘In God We Trust,’ and the 
Pledge of Allegiance w[ill] not survive under the endorsement test.”  Johnson, supra note 10, at 
178. 
 220. See Newdow, 5442 U.S. at 36-43 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  See also Thomas R. 
McCoy, A Coherent Methodology for First Amendment Speech and Religion Clause Cases, 48 
VAND. L. REV. 1335, 1339 (1995).  The Court has refused to invalidate ceremonial deism 
notwithstanding that such “obvious governmental manifestations of religion cannot be satisfactorily 
reconciled with . . . the Establishment Clause.”  Id.  Thus, judicial decisions on ceremonial deism 
“are viewed as exceptions to the establishment clause requirements.”  Id.  Justice O’Connor’s 
approach seeks to create a formalized “exception” for ceremonial deism under Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.  See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 36-43 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 221. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 669-70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that an Establishment 
test which reaches results inconsistent with history should be scrutinized).  “A test for implementing 
the protections of the Establishment Clause that, if applied with consistency, would invalidate 
longstanding traditions cannot be a proper reading of the Clause.”  Id. at 670.  Further, a proper 
Establishment Clause test “must permit not only legitimate practices two centuries old but also any 
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B. O’Connor’s Underlying Rationale Degrades the Religious Sentiment 
of Ceremonial Deism and Fails to Recognize Its Modern Benefits 
Ceremonial deism focuses on the history and tradition of a 
government action or expression.222  A legitimate secular purpose for a 
religious utterance only arises “when a given practice has been in place 
for a significant portion of the Nation’s history.”223  Specifically, Justice 
O’Connor focuses on the historical practice of ceremonial deism because 
repeated expression over a long period of time creates familiarity, 
thereby removing the religious character of an expression.224 
O’Connor’s assumption that ceremonial deism has lost its original 
religious meaning is dubious and does not comport with reality.225  One 
scholar has noted that “under any honest appraisal of modern American 
society, the practices constituting ceremonial deism have not lost their 
religious significance.”226  As a simple illustration of this point, consider 
 
other practices with no greater potential for an establishment of religion.”  Id. 
 222. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 36-38 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  The “history, character, and 
context” prevent ceremonial deism from violating the Constitution.  Id. at 37.  But see Epstein, 
supra note 143, at 2163-64.  Epstein argues that the fact that a practice was embraced by the 
Founders or has endured for a long period of time does not “immunize it from constitutional 
scrutiny.”  Id. at 2163.  “Rather than insulating ceremonial deism from constitutional attack, the 
longevity of the practices at issue makes their affront to religious minorities even more acute than 
would otherwise be the case.”  Id. at 2164. 
 223. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 37 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 224. See id. at 44.  O’Connor’s reasoning that familiarity removes the religious character of an 
expression mirrors the reasonsing of the Court in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961) 
(holding that Sunday Closing Laws do not violate the Establishment Clause).  In McGowan, the 
Court stated: 
Sunday Closing Laws, like those before us, have become part and parcel of this great 
governmental concern wholly apart from their original purposes or connotations. The 
present purpose and effect of most of them is to provide a uniform day of rest for all 
citizens; the fact that this day is Sunday, a day of particular significance for the dominant 
Christian sects, does not bar the State from achieving its secular goals. 
Id.  See also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303-04 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
concurring).  Justice Brennan states that there is no violation of the Establishment Clause when 
dealing with activities which, though religious in origin, have ceased to have a religious meaning.  
Id. at 303.  He suggests that the Pledge of Allegiance will fall into this protected category.  Id. at 
304. 
 225. See Epstein, supra note 143, at 2165.  See also Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 
2866-67 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Telling either nonbelievers or believers that the words 
‘under God’ have no meaning contradicts what they know to be true.”). 
 226. Id.  “[I]t would probably come as a great surprise to most Christians that religion is no 
longer a significant component of the Christmas holiday.  It would likely be equally surprising to 
the ministers delivering sermons on the floors of Congress . . . that their actions, over time, have lost 
religious significance.”  Id. at 2165-66.  See also Kelly C. Crabb, Religious Symbols, American 
Traditions and the Constitution, 1984 BYU L. REV. 509, 535 (1984) (proposing that though such 
symbols as the Pledge of Allegiance and the national motto are readily accepted in the American 
culture, they have not necessarily lost all of their religious meaning). 
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the heightened national interest in the Newdow case.227  Most of the 
public interest can be attributed to the fact that the plaintiff was seeking 
to remove words with religious sentiment from the Pledge.228  If these 
words had lost their religious meaning, the public, specifically 
religiously–motivated organizations, would not have taken such an 
interest in the outcome of the case.229  Further, it seems quite illogical 
and disingenuine to argue that words which have lost their religious 
meaning can, at the same time, serve to solemnize a public event.230 
According to Justice O’Connor, the primary rationale for upholding 
ceremonial deism is that such expressions contain minimum religious 
content231 and have lost whatever religious meaning they once held.232  
 
 227. See Charles Lane, Justices Keep “Under God” in Pledge, WASHINGTON POST, June 15, 
2004, at A1.  The Newdow decision at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declared the Elk Grove 
Unified School District’s Pledge Policy unconstitutional.  Id.  The ruling “sparked a political 
uproar.”  Id.  “[It] was denounced by the [P]resident and nearly the entire membership of Congress.”  
Id.  See also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 303 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that there would likely be 
intense opposition to the abandonment of the national motto); Rodney J. Blackman, Showing the Fly 
the Way Out of the Fly-Bottle: Making Sense of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 42 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 285, 312 (1994) (proposing that the removal of “In God we trust” from our coins would 
almost assuredly provoke the anger of religious people); Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the 
Supreme Court’s Law of Religious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 581, 650 n.82 (1995) (stating that one could safely predict that a general outcry would ensue if 
the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional governmental references to God); Basye, supra note 1, 
at 54 (stating that the Newdow case “created a media and Internet blitzkrieg”). 
 228. See Epstein, supra note 143, at 2166 (arguing that the words “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance “pack a powerful religious punch to both the most and the least devout members of the 
American population”).  Sandy Rios, President of Concerned Women for America, stated, “While 
[the Court] may be under the foolish notion that we have surpassed the need to honor or 
acknowledge [God], they must not be allowed to force their damnable arrogance on the rest of us.”  
Ted Olsen, Federal Appeals Court Says “Under God” in Pledge of Allegiance is Unconstitutional, 
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, June 27, 2002, available at http://www.christianitytoday.com 
/ct/2002/124/41.0.html (last visited November 13, 2004).  Likewise, the President of American 
Family Association stated, “The Ninth Circuit seems to be on a search and destroy mission to 
remove any and all vestiges of our religious heritage from the public square.”  Id.  Such statements 
indicate that the words “under God” retain a religious meaning, at least for a portion of American 
society. 
 229. See Epstein, supra note 143, at 2166.  “[T]o better understand the continued religious 
vitality of ceremonial deism, one need only imagine the reaction of the general public . . . if the 
Court were to declare that ‘under God’ in the Pledge of Allegiance or the national motto ‘In God 
We Trust’ violates the Constitution.”  Id. 
 230. See id. at 2165 (“If the religious meaning associated with ceremonial deism is ‘necessary 
to serve certain secular functions,’ as the solemnization rationale purports, it cannot also be true that 
these practices have lost whatever religious significance they may once have had.”). 
 231. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 42 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 232. See id. at 41 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  But see Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2867 (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (“[R]epetition does not deprive religious words or symbols of their traditional 
meaning.  Words like ‘God’ are not vulgarities for which the shock value diminishes with each 
successive utterance.”). 
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This reasoning further degrades the role of religion in our society.233  It 
embodies the principle that religious expressions are acceptable as long 
as they do not contain too much religious content and the content they 
do contain is no longer recognized as religious.234  This adheres to the 
flawed notion, inherent in the Court’s Establishment jurisprudence, that 
the government should not address religious issues and reinforces the 
message that religious views are “outdated”235 and “matter[s] of 
secondary importance.”236 
Further, O’Connor’s belief that ceremonial deism serves a secular 
purpose by commemorating the role of religion in America’s history 
fails to appreciate the modern role of religion in our republican form of 
limited government.237  In contrast to O’Connor’s view, expressions of 
ceremonial deism serve the primary secular purpose of protecting our 
fundamental rights.238  The Founders established a system of republican 
self–government dependant upon religion.239  Religion fosters a virtuous 
 
 233. See 141 CONG. REC. S19, 259-60 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) 
(noting hostility toward religion among local, state, and federal governments spawned by the 
Court’s Religion Clause jurisprudence).  See also Butler, supra note 117, at 851 (noting the 
Supreme Court’s effort to remove all traces of the Christian religion from public schools). 
 234. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 42  (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 235. Wallace, supra note 119, at 1200. 
 236. MOBERLY, supra note 119, at 56. 
 237. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Christian Legal Soc’y, The Ctr. for Pub. Justice, 
Concerned Women for Am, and Christian Educators Ass’n Int’l, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) (No. 02-1624) [hereinafter Brief of Christian Legal Soc’y] (stating 
that the “inalienable rights” concept, embodied in the Declaration of Independence, is the 
foundation of the fundamental rights of all Americans and the basis for our concept of limited 
government). 
 238. See Brief of Christian Legal Soc’y at 2-7, Newdow (No. 02-1624) (arguing that the phrase 
“under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance represents a proposition that all individuals are “endowed 
by their Creator with certain inalienable rights” and this principle is the basis for America’s concept 
of limited government); Brief of Amicus Curiae The Claremont Inst. Ctr. for Constitutional 
Jurisprudence at 11-24, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) (No. 02-
1624) [hereinafter Brief of Claremont Inst.] (arguing that the Pledge of Allegiance fosters an 
appreciation for the principles upon which America was founded, including the principle that the 
government is instituted to protect citizen’s inalienable rights). 
 239. Brief of Claremont Inst. at 13, Newdow (No. 02-1624).  A “republic” is defined as “a 
government in which supreme power resides in a body of citizens entitled to vote and is exercised 
by elected officers and representatives responsible to them and governing according to law.”  
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, available at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-
bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=republic (last visited November 17, 2004).  James Madison 
defined a republic as “a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the 
great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a 
limited period, or during good behavior.” JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 251  (Jacob 
E. Cooke ed., 1961).  The procedures for ratification, structure of the legislature, limits on 
legislative power, and provisions for amendment of the Constitution indicate whether a government 
is truly a republic.  Id. at 253-57. 
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citizenry which is an essential component of a flourishing republic.240  
More importantly, American government was founded on the principles 
that “all [people] are created equal” and that “they are endowed, by their 
Creator, with certain unalienable rights” which the government must 
secure and not infringe.241 
The Founders correctly recognized that the government or Supreme 
Court does not grant our rights, but rather they originated from “our 
Creator.”242  Thus, the “scope of governmental authority over individuals 
is inherently limited with respect to their exercise of inalienable rights 
given by God.”243  Government expressions of ceremonial deism 
acknowledge that the Creator is the source of all fundamental rights.244  
If Americans forget this foundational principle and wrongly believe that 
the government or the people are the ultimate source of our rights, such 
ignorance will place our rights on shaky ground.245  Without 
 
 240. See Brief of Claremont Inst. at 12-13, Newdow (No. 02-1624).  “[O]ur nation’s Founders 
repeatedly acknowledged the role that moral virtue had to play if their experiment in self-
government was to be successful.”  Id. at 12.  One example of this includes the Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780 which states that “the happiness of a people, and the good order and 
preservation of civil government, essentially depend upon piety, religion, and morality . . . .”  MASS. 
CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. 3.  James Madison recognized the importance of virtue when he stated 
that a “[r]epublican government presupposes the existence of [virtue] in a higher degree than any 
other form [of government].”  JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, at 346 (Clinton Rossiter 
and Charles Kesler eds., 1999).  See also supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. 
 241. The Declaration of Independence, P2 (U.S. 1776), available at http://www.law. 
indiana.edu/uslawdocs/declaration.html (last visited November 17, 2004). 
 242. See The Declaration of Independence, P2 (U.S. 1776), available at http://www.law. 
indiana.edu/uslawdocs/declaration.html (last visited November 17, 2004).  “[T]he very idea that 
people have rights that precede and are superior to government is based on the self-evident truth 
articulated in the Declaration of Independence that human beings ‘are endowed, by their Creator, 
with certain unalienable rights,’ including the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”  
Brief of Claremont Inst. at 19, Newdow (No. 02-164).  In his Memorial and Remonstrance Against 
Religious Assessments, James Madison recognized that one’s duty to the Creator transcends one’s 
duty to society thereby implying that the rights from the Creator transcend the rights granted by the 
government.  See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 64 (1947) (appendix to 
dissenting opinion of Rutledge, J.). 
It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage . . . as he believes to be 
acceptable to him.  This duty is precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation, 
to the claims of Civil Society.  Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil 
Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governor of the Universe[.] 
Id. 
 243. Brief of Christian Legal Soc’y at 5, Newdow (No. 02-1624). 
 244. See id. at 3-4.  The phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance reinforces that our 
form of government is “grounded in the concept that individuals are endowed by God with certain 
inalienable rights.”  Id.  Such expressions acknowledge that the government is not the highest 
authority in human affairs.  Id. at 4. 
 245. See Brief of Claremont Inst. at 19, Newdow (No. 02-1624).  “If our liberties are to be 
preserved against the encroaching tendencies of government, it is imperative that the next 
generation be educated with an appreciation of [the principle that human beings are endowed, by 
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appreciation for the source of our rights, the courts will have no rationale 
for upholding them, and Americans will be in danger of losing them.246  
Thus, O’Connor is incorrect when she states that instances of ceremonial 
deism are constitutionally protected because they have lost their 
religious sentiment,247 and she fails to appreciate the full societal benefit 
of such expressions when she states that they serve to commemorate the 
role of religion in our Nation’s founding.248  Rather, ceremonial deism is 
constitutionally permissible, indeed profitable, because it acknowledges 
that the Creator, not the government, is the basis of our rights.249 
VI. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE ACTUAL LEGAL 
COERCION TEST 
A. Adoption of the Actual Legal Coercion Test Will Bring Clarity and 
Consistency to Establishment Clause Jurisprudence 
The adoption of Justice Thomas’s actual legal coercion test will 
“provide Establishment Clause jurisprudence with clarity and 
predictability.”250  Generally, application of an objective standard 
provides greater predictability than use of a subjective standard.251  
 
their Creator, with certain unalienable rights].”  Id. 
 246. See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional 
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 223-25 (1991) (arguing that our right to religious freedom will 
be shaken if the courts undermine the rationale for the right).  Smith argues: 
[W]ithout a plausible rationale for the commitment to religious liberty[,] we cannot 
understand what that commitment entails.  It is commonplace that legal enactments 
should be interpreted to effectuate their purposes.  But a law’s “purpose” arises out of, 
and is a projection of, its justification.  Therefore, if we cannot articulate a convincing 
justification for the commitment to religious freedom[,] then we cannot know its 
purpose, and we are accordingly paralyzed in our efforts to interpret the commitment.  In 
addition, it is unrealistic to expect a commitment to retain its vitality merely because it is 
written into the Constitution. 
Id. at 223-24. 
 247. See supra notes 225-230 and accompanying text. 
 248. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 35(O’Connor, J., concurring).  O’Connor acknowledges that one 
secular purpose for ceremonial deism is “to commemorate the role of religion in our history.”  Id.  
However, she seems unwilling to commemorate the role of religion for its positive value, but only 
because “references to religion in public life and government are the inevitable consequence of our 
Nation’s origins.”  Id.  See also supra notes 237-246 and accompanying text. 
 249. See Brief of Claremont Inst. at 19, Newdow (No. 02-1624). 
 250. Johnson, supra note 10, at 178. 
 251. See id.  Objective standards generally bring greater predictability and consistency to legal 
analysis.  See, e.g., David J. Damiani, Proposals for Reform in the Evaluation of Expert Testimony 
in Pharmaceutical Mass Tort Cases, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 517, 526 (2003) (arguing that an 
objective standard for what constitutes “expertise” on a particular subject would likely bring greater 
predictability to mass tort cases). 
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Analysis under the actual legal coercion test focuses on the concrete 
effects of the questioned government action.252  This objective analysis 
provides greater consistency and renders judicial manipulation more 
difficult.253 
The actual legal coercion test will replace the current multi-test 
approach.254  The use of a single standard eliminates the need to 
determine which Establishment test should apply in a given situation, 
thus increasing analytical uniformity.255  In the past, Justice O’Connor 
has recognized that “[i]t is always appealing to look for a single test, a 
Grand Unified Theory that [will] resolve all the cases that may arise 
under a particular Clause.”256  Such a unifying test must consider the 
 
 252. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 178.  On the other hand, the psychological coercion 
standard focuses on the appearances surrounding such governmental action.  Id. at 178-79.  Activist 
judges can use such a subjective standard to achieve desired results by interpreting cases in an 
outcome-oriented fashion.  Id. at 179. 
 253. Johnson, supra note 10, at 179. 
 254. See John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American 
Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 372, 432 (1996) (arguing that the Court must 
strive towards a more unified approach to Establishment Clause jurisprudence). 
 255. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).  As this case progressed through the appeals 
process, the courts applied three of the four Establishment Clause tests in addressing the issue.  See 
id. at 584-87.  The case involved a non-sectarian prayer at a middle school graduation.  Id. 580-81.  
The district court relied on the Lemon test in holding that the principal’s practice of including prayer 
at a public school graduation violated the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 584-85.  The First Circuit 
upheld the district court’s ruling.  Id. at 585.  Circuit Judge Campbell’s dissent relied on the Marsh 
approach in his decision to uphold graduation prayer.  See Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090, 1098 
(1st Cir. 1990) (Campbell, dissenting) aff’d, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).  He interpreted the Marsh 
decision as applying to prayer at all public meetings, not merely legislative prayer.  Id.  
Interestingly, when the case reached the Supreme Court, the reasoning of the First Circuit’s majority 
and dissenting opinions were abandoned in favor of Justice Kennedy’s “psychological coercion 
test.”  Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.  The Lee case demonstrates how discarding the multi-test approach will 
provide greater clarity for lower courts and consistency in analyzing these cases throughout the 
federal court hierarchy.  See id. at 584-87. 
 256. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718 (1994) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  O’Connor recognizes that “setting forth a unitary test for a broad set of 
cases may sometimes do more harm than good.”  Id.  She believes that “[a]ny test that must deal 
with widely disparate situations risks being so vague as to be useless.”  Id.  Trying to analyze a new 
issue using a broad test, which does not reflect the special concerns raised by that particular issue, 
“tends to deform the language of the test.”  Id. at 719.  Courts often try to fix the problems inherent 
in a broad test, eventually making it more vague and distorted.  Id. at 720.  According to O’Connor, 
experience has shown that multiple tests are needed to adequately evaluate Establishment cases.  Id.  
She further believes that a multi-test approach provides a better structure for analysis.  Id. at 721.  
However, she acknowledges that one day the Court may identify a unified Establishment Clause 
test.  Id.  See also Matthew S. Steffey, Symposium: Voting Rights after Shaw v. Reno: Article: The 
Establishment Clause and the Lessons of Context, 26 RUTGERS L. J. 775, 777 (1995) (arguing in 
support of O’Connor’s position that a less unitary approach provides a better analytical structure.)  
But see Grumet, 512 U.S. at 750-51 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia argues that 
Establishment analysis should be driven by one unifying principle – fidelity to the longstanding 
traditions of our people.  Id. at 751. 
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special interests inherent in the different categories of Establishment 
Clause cases.257  There are at least three broad categories of cases which 
implicate Establishment Clause issues: (1) government action that grants 
special benefits or powers to religious organizations; (2) government 
speech and displays implicating religion; and (3) government decisions 
regarding religious doctrines.258  The actual legal coercion test must 
address each category in a manner that reflects the intent and meaning 
behind the Establishment Clause.259  Thus, the test must encapsulate the 
very essence of the Establishment Clause260 and embrace “the 
longstanding traditions of our people.”261 
1. Situations Where the Government Grants Money, Power, or 
Other Benefits to a Religious Organization 
The actual legal coercion test effectively addresses situations where 
the government grants funding to a religious group.262  The language of 
the test specifically prohibits government action involving coercion of 
financial support for a particular religious organization “by force of law 
 
 257. See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 718-21 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor 
acknowledges that there are at least four different categories of Establishment cases.  See id. at 720-
21.  One category involves government actions that grant special duties or benefits upon religious 
groups or individuals.  See, e.g., id. (holding that a state government cannot create a separate school 
district for a village containing practitioners of a strict form of Judaism).  Another category includes 
government speech involving religion.  See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (involving a public 
school graduation prayer); Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (involving a crèche scene and menorah 
on public property).  A third category involves situations where the government makes decisions 
about religious doctrines.  See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Can. v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (holding that an Establishment Clause violation occurs when a 
state supreme court addresses allocation of power issues within a church).  A fourth category of 
cases deal with government delegations of power to a religious organization.  See, e.g., Larkin v. 
Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (holding that a statute conferring to a church with a veto power 
over the liquor licensing authority violated the Establishment Clause). 
 258. See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 718-21 (O’Connor, J., concurring); supra note 257 and 
accompanying text. 
 259. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673-74 (1984) (emphasizing the importance of history and the 
Founders’ contemporary understanding of the Establishment Clause).  See also supra notes 29-57. 
 260. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 50-52 (Thomas, J., concurring) (The type of coercion which 
characterizes this test is the same “coercion that was a hallmark of historical establishments of 
religion”). 
 261. See Witte, supra note 254, at 432 (quoting Grumet, 512 U.S. at 751 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)).  Justice Scalia believes that “our Constitution, cannot possibly rest upon the 
changeable philosophical predilections of the Justices of this Court, but must have deep foundations 
in the historic practices of our people.”  Lee, 505 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 262. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 611 (1988) (involving a statute providing 
funding to sectarian and secular institutions on a neutral basis); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 
U.S. 639 (2002) (involving a government program providing tuition aid for students to attend a 
public or private school of the parent’s choosing). 
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and threat of penalty.”263  Thus, Thomas’s test corresponds with the 
Court’s prevailing rule that the Establishment Clause “prohibit[s] 
government–financed or government-sponsored indoctrination into the 
beliefs of a particular religious faith.”264  Currently, the Supreme Court 
allows the granting of financial aid to religious schools on a neutral 
basis.265  Similarly, the actual legal coercion test would allow such 
funding because the government is not forcing individuals to submit to 
religious indoctrination or coercing the financial support of a particular 
religious group.266  Another important funding issue is whether the 
government can fund religiously–based social reform groups.267  Under 
the actual legal coercion test, these social programs are constitutionally 
permissible as long as the funds are distributed indiscriminately and the 
government does not actually coerce participation in the religiously-
 
 263. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 52 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. 640-41 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting)). 
 264. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 611 (holding that a statute providing funding to sectarian and secular 
institutions on a neutral basis did not violate the Establishment Clause).  See also Steven K. Green, 
Charitable Choice and Neutrality Theory, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 33, 46 (2000) 
(emphasizing that the government must not finance, encourage, or support religious indoctrination).  
Compare Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (holding that an educational 
program which financed classes for nonpublic school students violated the Establishment Clause), 
overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (holding that a federally funded program 
providing instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis was valid under the Establishment 
Clause when such instruction was given on the premises of sectarian schools by government 
employees), and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (holding that the distribution of federal 
funds to pay the salaries of public teachers who taught in parochial schools violated the 
Establishment Claue). 
 265. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).  In Zelman, the Court upheld a 
program providing education choices to families residing in the Cleveland School District.  Id. at 
643-44.  The program provides tuition aid for students to attend a participating public or private 
school of the parents’ choosing and tutorial aid for students who choose to remain in the public 
school.  Id. at 645.  The Court found that “where a government aid program is neutral with respect 
to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct 
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private 
choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.”  Id. at 652.  
Analysis under the actual legal coercion test would reach the same result because the government is 
not seeking to legally coerce the religious education or indoctrination of any student.  See id. at 680 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 266. See id. at 680 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 267. See Green, supra note 264 (arguing that Charitable Choice funding of faith-based 
organizations creates a grave risk of government-financed indoctrination); Elizabeth Tobin, 
Blurring the Line Separating Church and State: California Exposes the Inherent Problems of 
Charitable Choice, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1629 (2002) (arguing that the Charitable Choice Act violates 
the religion clauses and creates obstacles for states with laws requiring contraception coverage); 
Michelle Dibadj, The Legal and Social Consequences of Faith-Based Initiatives and Charitable 
Choice, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 529 (2002) (exploring the constitutionality of President Bush’s faith-based 
initiative to implement the existing charitable choice provision). 
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based programs.268 
The actual legal coercion test is also capable of addressing those 
rare instances where the government bestows its power upon a specific 
religious group.269  The test prohibits the granting of legal authority to 
members of a particular faith.270  This coincides with the current rule that 
the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from delegating its 
power to a religious group or a group chosen according to religious 
criterion.271  Further, the government cannot require a religious oath to 
obtain government office or benefits because such a requirement creates 
a legal benefit for members of that faith.272  Because these actions 
resemble the creation of a coercive state establishment, the actual legal 
coercion test also prevents the government from conferring legal power 
or legal benefits upon a religious group.273 
2. Situations Involving Government Speech and Displays 
Implicating Religion 
Because speech is not inherently coercive, most instances of 
government speech will be upheld as constitutional under the actual 
legal coercion test.274  Many scholars will find this to be a tremendous 
 
 268. See Newdow, 542 U.S. 51-52 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 269. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (a statute, in effect, granted a 
church veto power over the liquor licensing authority). 
 270. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 51-52 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 271. See, e.g., Larkin, 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (holding that a statute conferring a church with a 
veto power over the liquor licensing authority violated the Establishment Clause); Grumet, 512 U.S. 
687 (1994) (a state statute carving out a separate school district for a religious village violated the 
Establishment Clause).  A statute or other government action cannot substitute “the unilateral and 
absolute power of a church for the reasoned decisionmaking of a public legislative body acting on 
evidence and guided by standards, on issues with significant economic and political implications.”  
Larkin, 459 U.S. at 127.  “[A] [s]tate may not delegate its civic authority to a group chosen 
according to a religious criterion.”  Grumet, 512 U.S. at 698.  Authority belonging to the state 
cannot be delegated in order to grant political control to a religious group.  Id. 
 272. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (ruling that a state constitution cannot 
require persons who qualified for any office of profit or trust in the state to declare their belief in the 
existence of God).  “Neither a state nor the federal government can constitutionally force a person 
‘to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.’”  Id. at 495. 
 273. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 51-52 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Thomas acknowledges that 
under his test the government would be prohibited from “establishing” a religion “by imbuing it 
with governmental authority or by ‘delegating its civic authority to a group chosen according to a 
religious criterion.’” Id. at 52 (citations omitted).  “A religious organization that carries some 
measure of the authority of the State begins to look like a traditional ‘religious establishment,’ at 
least when that authority can be used coercively.”  Id. 
 274. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 642 (quoting American Jewish Congress v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 
132 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)). 
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flaw with the implementation of the actual legal coercion test;275 
however, this actually strengthens the argument in favor of its use.  First, 
it more accurately reflects the Founders’ intent because they were 
concerned with governmental compulsion and coercion, not speech.276  
Second, offended citizens are not directly harmed or prevented from 
believing and acting as their conscience dictates.277  Third, an 
individual’s ability to practice his or her religious beliefs is protected by 
the Free Exercise Clause.278  Fourth, courts can use the Equal Protection 
 
 275. See Brian T. Coolidge, From Mount Sinai to the Courtroom: Why Courtroom Displays of 
the Ten Commandments and Other Religious Texts Violate the Establishment Clause, 39 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 101 (1997) (arguing that an isolated display of the Ten Commandments in a courtroom 
conveys a message of impermissible religious endorsement and thus violates the Establishment 
Clause); Harry Simon, Rebuilding the Wall Between Church and State: Public Sponsorship of 
Religious Displays Under the Federal and California Constitutions, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 499 (1986) 
(discussing the need for substantial Establishment Clause guarantees against state-sponsored 
religious displays).  But see Wallace, supra note 119, at 1187 (stating that government religious 
speech is analytically different from other forms of government support of religion and arguing that 
the Court should employ a unique approach to assessing its constitutionality). 
 276. See McConnell, Coercion, supra note 122, at 936-39 (arguing that compulsion is the 
essence of an establishment).  James Madison stated that the colonists “feared [that] one [religious] 
sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to which they 
would compel others to conform.”  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (J. Gales ed. 1834).  Thus 
according to Madison, compulsion is the essence of an establishment of religion.  McConnell, 
Coercion, supra note 122, at 937.  The Establishment Clause was not intended to protect 
“individuals from mere feelings of exclusion.”  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 673 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting).  See also Wallace, supra note 119, at 1226-54 (summarizing the Founders’ views 
regarding government religious speech and the use of government religious speech in the Founding 
era).  “The founders did not believe that disestablishment foreclosed the government from 
recognizing the providence of God in national affairs or from acknowledging the value of religion to 
the republic.”  Id. at 1254.  They believed that “official religious speech generally did not entail the 
imposition of religion by the state so long as it was nonpreferential and noncoercive.”  Id. 
 277. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) (discussing the essence 
of the First Amendment).  “[A]t the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual 
should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s beliefs should be shaped by his 
mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.”  Id.  The Free Exercise Clause guarantees 
that an individual will be allowed to worship and believe in accord with his conscience.  John 
Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1685), reprinted in MAIN CURRENTS OF WESTERN 
THOUGHT 355 (Franklin Le Van Baumer ed., 1978).  Further, the Free Speech Clause prevents 
government action which seeks to coerce or prevent individual speech.  See United States v. United 
Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001).  The First Amendment not only prevents the government 
from silencing individual speech, it also prevents the government from compelling individuals to 
express certain views.  Id.  See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) 
(holding that a public school may not require students to salute the American flag or recite the 
Pledge of Allegiance).  But see Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 (arguing that offended citizens suffer an injury 
when exposed to government speech which involves religion). 
     278.    See U.S. CONST. amend. I. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Justice Thomas argues that 
“[i]t may well be the case that anything that would violate the incorporated Establishment Clause 
would actually violate the Free Exercise Clause.”  Newdow, 542 U.S. at 53 n.4.  This is further 
evidence against the incorporation of the Establishment Clause.  Id. 
45
Campbell: Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006
CAMPBELL1.DOC 4/14/2006  1:14:41 PM 
586 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:541 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent the government from 
intentionally giving preferential treatment to one religious sect.279  Fifth, 
upset citizens can seek redress through political means – such as voicing 
their displeasure with the government’s religious speech, petitioning the 
government with their concerns, or electing other officials who represent 
their views.280  Finally, Thomas’s test will nevertheless prohibit extreme 
government speech that is backed by “force of law or threat of 
penalty.”281 
Excluding most government speech and display cases from 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence solves the aberration of ceremonial 
deism.282  Completely devoid of legal coercion, expressions of 
ceremonial deism fall far short of violating Justice Thomas’s test.283  As 
 
 279. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and Response to the 
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 706 (1992) (“The logic of the Religion Clauses requires that 
accommodations be extended to all comparable religious practices unless the government has 
sufficient justification for differential treatment.”); Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem 
of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 982-87 (1989) (arguing that 
Equal Protection Clause must be invoked to prevent religious discrimination).  But see Eugene 
Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1542-44 (1999) 
(arguing that democratic process properly may set policies that have differential effects on different 
religions). 
 280. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging . . . the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people . . . to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.  Id.  See also Lori J. Rankin, Ballot Initiatives and Gay 
Rights: Equal Protection Challenges to the Right’s Campaign Against Lesbians and Gay Men 62 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1055, 1099-1100 (1994) (discussing citizen participation in the political process). 
Indeed, exercising the fundamental right to vote is but one means of participating in the 
political process.  Other participatory rights are explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, 
such as the right of free speech and the right to petition the government for redress of 
grievances.  These rights “spring from a common root. . . .  At their core [these] rights 
are rights to participate in [the political] process.”  One purpose for recognizing these 
rights is to protect the most basic of all rights in a democratic system: the right to 
participate in the processes.  The right to vote, the right to speak, and the right to petition 
the government are vehicles through which citizens participate in their own governing. 
Id. 
 281. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Government acts that create or 
maintain “a sort of coercive state establishment” violate the actual legal coercion test.  Id.  It 
remains unclear how the test will be applied in situations involving excessive government speech 
which is not backed by “force of law or threat of penalty.”  See id.  An example of such 
questionable government speech includes speech advocating attendance at a specific church. 
 282. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 674 n.10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Kennedy acknowledges 
that the Court’s current Establishment jurisprudence cannot explain why ceremonial deism such as 
“Thanksgiving Proclamations, the reference to God in the Pledge of Allegiance, and invocations to 
God in sessions of Congress and [the Supreme] Court . . . constitute practices that the Court will not 
proscribe.”  Id.  See also supra notes 205-221 and accompanying text. 
 283. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 53 (Thomas, J., concurring).  “It is difficult to see how 
government practices which have nothing to do with creating or maintaining [a] coercive state 
establishment” violate the Establishment Clause.  Id. 
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long as the government does not force an individual to affirm a religious 
expression, ceremonial deism does not violate the actual legal coercion 
test.284  The test also reconciles the dichotomy between legislative and 
graduation prayer.285  Under the Court’s current approach, legislative 
prayer is constitutional286 while graduation prayer violates the 
Establishment Clause.287  The Court has repeatedly attempted to explain 
this inconsistency288 but none have satisfied.289  Under the actual legal 
coercion test, both legislative and graduation prayer are constitutionally 
valid.290  Finally, this test restores the constitutionality of other practices 
which have been recognized for a significant portion of our Nation’s 
history – including displays of the Ten Commandments291 and crèche 
 
 284. See Hillary A. Webber, Equal Justice Under the Law: Why IOLTA Programs Do Not 
Violate the First Amendment, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 491, 505-08 (2003) (discussing compelled speech 
cases and noting that the government may not force an individual to affirm a belief). 
 285. See Penny J. Meyers, Lemon is Alive and Kicking: Using the Lemon Test to Determine 
the Constitutionality of Prayer at High School Graduation Ceremonies, 34 VAL. U.L. REV. 231, 
242-43 (1999) (stating that the Court has used the psychological coercion test to invalidate 
graduation prayer while using the separate Marsh approach to uphold legislative prayer).  But see 
Stein v. Plainwell Community Sch., 822 F.2d 1406, 1409-10 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding graduation 
prayers analogous to legislative prayers but holding that the graduation prayer at issue did not meet 
the Marsh standard because it expressed preference for Christianity). 
 286. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (upholding legislative prayer as 
constitutional). 
 287. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (invalidating graduation prayer as an 
Establishment Clause violation). 
 288. See Rena M. Bila, The Establishment Clause: A Constitutional Permission Slip for 
Religion in Public Education, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1535, 1593-94 (1995) (discussing Kennedy’s 
attempt in Lee to explain the differences between legislative and graduation prayer).  Kennedy 
provided three reasons for treating legislative and graduation prayer differently.  Id. 
First, in Lee, students were exposed to prayer in a setting where they could not 
comfortably and freely leave.  This restriction constituted a greater coercive influence 
than in Marsh, where legislators were free to leave if they wished.  Second, school 
officials retained a high degree of control over all aspects of the graduation ceremony, 
which left students with no real choice but to submit to its content.  Third, the prayers in 
Lee were presented in an atmosphere where fellow students exerted subtle pressures to 
conform. 
Id.  See also Edward v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 n.4 (1987).  The Supreme Court has also found 
that graduation prayer is not similar to legislative prayer and cannot be justified under the Marsh 
approach because “free public education was virtually nonexistent at the time the Constitution was 
adopted.”  Id. 
 289. See Steven G. Gey, When is Religious Speech Not “Free Speech”?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 
379, 460 n. 247 (2000) (stating that the Supreme Court’s dealing with legislative prayer seems to be 
inconsistent with its analysis of graduation prayer).  See also Robert K. DuPuy, Religion, 
Graduation, and the First Amendment: A Threat or a Shadow?, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 323 (1985-86) 
(arguing that graduation prayer, like legislative prayer, should be declared constitutional). 
 290. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 47 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Many instances of public prayer 
such as Presidential Inaugurations will be found constitutional under this test.  See id. 
 291. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding that a Kentucky statute requiring 
the posting of the Ten Commandments in public classrooms was a violation of the Establishment 
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scenes on government property.292 
3. Situations Involving Government Decisions Regarding Religious 
Doctrines 
Government participation in church affairs violates the actual legal 
coercion test.293  This result is consistent with the Court’s current 
approach toward these issues.294  Government involvement in internal 
church dealings, especially church doctrines, is one of the hallmarks of 
an established religion.295  Indeed, one of the functions of a government–
established church is to protect and uphold the uniformity of church 
doctrines.296  Thus, government entwinement in the intricacies of 
internal church affairs begins to resemble a traditional establishment.297  
Furthermore, a judicial decision regarding church matters, either 
doctrinal or organizational, is by definition a government command 
backed by “threat of penalty.”298 
 
Clause).  See also Julia Duin, Top Court to Consider Commandment Cases, WASHINGTON TIMES, 
October 13, 2004, at A1.  On October 12, 2004, the Supreme Court agreed to hear two cases 
addressing the issue of whether the Ten Commandments can be posted in public buildings or public 
lands.  Id.  Under the actual legal coercion test, such displays would be constitutional.  See Newdow, 
124 S. Ct. at 2331-32 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 292. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (striking down a holiday display of a crèche on 
government property while upholding a holiday display including a menorah, Christmas tree, and 
sign). 
 293. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 52 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 294. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 
U.S. 696 (1976) (holding that an Establishment Clause violation occurs when a state supreme court 
addresses allocation of power issues within a church).  “Whenever the questions of discipline, or of 
faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church 
judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as 
final, and as binding on them.”  Id. at 710.  The Establishment Clause also limits “the role that civil 
courts may play in resolving church property disputes.”  Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 
U.S. 440, 449 (1969). 
 295. See LEVY, supra note 21, at 3-5.  Government-established churches in colonial America 
each had an official creed or articles of faith.  Id. at 5.  The government was instrumental in 
determining who was ordained as a minister of the church.  Id. at 3.  In order for a man to become 
an ordained member of the clergy, the government demanded that he accept the doctrines of the 
church.  Id. at 4. 
 296. See Wallace, supra note 119, at 1227-28 (stating that one of the purpose behind religious 
establishments in the colonies was maintaining the purity of church doctrine). 
 297. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 52 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 298. See id.  When a person engages in conduct that defiles the authority or dignity of a court, 
he or she is said to be in contempt of court.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 336 (8th ed. 1990).  
Because such conduct interferes with the administration of justice, it is punishable by fine or 
imprisonment.  Id.  Thus a judgment will be classified as coercion backed by “threat of penalty or 
force of law.”  Newdow, 542 U.S. at 52 (Thomas, J., concurring).  See also Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 
710 (finding that questions of church discipline or doctrine should not be addressed by civil courts). 
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B. The Actual Legal Coercion Test Restores a Proper Respect for 
Religion 
The actual legal coercion test removes the religious hostility 
inherent in the Court’s current analysis.299  Above all, the test allows the 
government to speak about religion.300  Removing the religious gag 
order on the government dispels the notion of an entirely secular state.301  
When the government speaks about religion in a noncoercive and 
nonsectarian manner, it is viewed as encouraging both religious and 
secular views, instead of preferring the secular over the religious.302  
Accepting government religious speech on equal footing with secular 
issues will begin to erode the stigma that religion has acquired in the 
public arena.303  In time, this will transform religion from “something so 
private that it is . . . irrelevant to public life”304 to something that holds a 
treasured role in our society.305 
Specifically, the actual legal coercion test will restore respect for 
majority religions.306  “It is intellectually fashionable and mainstream to 
read the [Establishment Clause] as only protecting the liberties of 
minorities and not those of the majority.”307  Current Establishment 
 
 299. See infra notes 300-318 and accompanying text. 
 300. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 642 (1992).  In discussing the actual legal coercion test, Justice 
Scalia recognizes that “speech is not coercive; the listener may do as he likes.”  Id. 
 301. Wallace, supra note 119, at 1256. 
 302. See id. 
 303. See McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 10, at 193.  According to Judge McConnell, if 
government speech concerning religion reflected the views of the culture as a whole, this would 
effectively achieve “neutrality” in a pluralistic society.  Id.  Allowing the government to speak on 
religious topics will reverse the degradation of religion that government silence creates.  See 
Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE L.J. 
977, 978 (1987) (religious neutrality and government silence will eventually result in the diminution 
of religious beliefs so that it “will ultimately become a kind of hobby: something so private that it is 
as irrelevant to public life as the building of model airplanes”) [hereinafter Carter, Evolutionism]. 
 304. Carter, Evolutionism, supra note 303, at 978. 
 305. See Charles J. Russo, The Supreme Court and Pledge of Allegiance: Does God Still Have 
a Place in American Schools?, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 301, 329-30 (2004).  The decision of the 
Court whether to remove all references to God from government speech will ultimately “reveal 
whether Americans still cherish the underlying values of freedom of religion . . . that contribute so 
greatly to the Nation’s history.”  Id. at 329. 
 306. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 191-94 (arguing that the direct coercion standard, which is 
another name for the actual legal coercion test, guarantees religious freedom for members of 
majority religions). 
 307. Id. at 191.  For example, if a person criticizes the beliefs of a Muslim or Buddhist, he or 
she will face persecution by those in academia.  See, e.g., Rob Dreher, Damned If You Do, 
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, October 29, 2002, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/dreher/ 
dreher102902.asp (last visited February 12, 2005) (stating that historians who dare to discuss the 
religious persecutions that Jews and Christians endure as a result of Islamic dhimmitude face a great 
deal of criticism at Georgetown).  However, if another person berates the beliefs of a Roman 
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analysis inhibits the free exercise rights of those in the religious majority 
in order to protect members of religious minorities from unease.308  Such 
discriminatory treatment of the majority believer inherently favors the 
beliefs of the minority.309  Thus, current Establishment standards expect 
tolerance from the majority while failing to require it from the minority 
as well.310  Conversely, the actual legal coercion test recognizes and 
respects government recognition of the beliefs and practices of the 
religious majority so long as the government does not support such 
beliefs by “force of law or threat of penalty.”311 
The consistency and objectivity of the actual legal coercion test will 
limit the hostility that activist judges are able to infiltrate into their 
decision–making.312  The test provides a consistent approach with which 
to address Establishment issues.313  The use of one standard for all 
Establishment cases prevents activist judges from arbitrarily choosing 
between multiple tests in order to achieve desired results.314  Further, by 
ignoring perceived or psychological coercion, the actual legal coercion 
 
Catholic as being “out of step” with the modern world, he or she is applauded for seeing through the 
flaws of this religious faith.  See, e.g., Janet Kalven, Fifteen Years of Ferment: Religious Feminists, 
MONTHLY REVIEW, July 1984, at 73 (discussing feminist criticism of Vatican II and other Roman 
Catholic doctrines). 
 308. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 645-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia recognizes that the Lee 
majority takes great pains to consider the rights of the religious minority.  Id. at 645.  However, the 
Court often fails to consider the majority’s interests in religious expression.  Id. at 646.  Such an 
analytical focus indicates that “the Court has begun to subscribe to the view that avoiding 
establishment is the goal of the First Amendment, and free exercise is but an exception.”  Johnson, 
supra note 10, at 191. 
 309. See Lisa Shaw Roy, The Establishment Clause and the Concept of Inclusion, 83 OR. L. 
REV. 1, 25-27 (2004) (discussing majority and minority issues involving Establishment 
jurisprudence).  See also Johnson, supra note 10, at 193 (stating that “a brief reference to [the Free 
Exercise Clause] reveals the discrimination presently imposed upon the majority of Americans by 
the present standard applied in Establishment Clause jurisprudence”). 
 310. See Roy, supra note 309, at 40-44 (arguing that the Supreme Court has left behind the 
idea of tolerance in Establishment analysis).  See also Justice Antonin Scalia, Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 16-17, Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005)(No. 03-1500) (p. 16, line 25 and p. 
17, lines 1-9).  In the oral argument of the Van Orden case, Justice Scalia acknowledged a lack of 
tolerance for majority religious views when he stated that “[America is] a tolerant society 
religiously, but just as the majority has to be tolerant of minority views in matters of religion, it 
seems to me the minority has to be tolerant of the majority’s ability to express its belief that 
government comes from God.”  Id.  Just as is expected from the majority believer, the minority 
religious adherent can “turn [his or her] eyes [from a religious display] if it is such a big deal.”  Id. 
 311. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at  52 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 312. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 178-79. 
 313. See id. at 178.  See also supra notes 250-298 and accompanying text. 
 314. See Richard A. Epstein, Property: Why is This Man a Moderate, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1758, 
1774 (1996) (“The invocation of multiple standards of review increases the number of opportunities 
for judicial discretion – and judicial confusion.”). 
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test is an objective analysis.315  Objective legal analysis serves to limit 
judicial discretion.316  Establishment analysis will focus on “the actual 
effects of governmental power”317 thus limiting a judge’s ability to 
infuse his or her religious hostility into a decision.318 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Justice Thomas’s actual legal coercion test provides a preferable 
alternative to Establishment Clause analysis.  O’Connor’s ceremonial 
deism approach adds an additional test to an already perplexing area of 
constitutional law.  Further, this additional test demeans the religious 
importance of expressions of ceremonial deism and serves as evidence 
of a deeper flaw in Establishment analysis.  Rather than degrade religion 
and further complicate this area of the law, Justice Thomas’s actual legal 
coercion test brings well–needed clarity and consistency.  By allowing 
the government to speak religiously, this test also serves to reverse the 
debasement of religion in our society. 
Due to its recent hostility toward religion, the Court is not likely to 
jump at the opportunity to adopt a new test which serves to alleviate this 
animosity.  However, many of the Justices agree that the Establishment 
Clause’s analytical framework needs heavy renovation.319  More than 
being just a step in the restoration process, the actual legal coercion test 
erects an entirely new structure.  Its consistency and objectivity alone are 
sufficient reasons to adopt this test as a means of rectifying 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
In Newdow, the Court missed an opportunity to remedy 
Establishment Clause analysis.  It cannot continue to ignore this problem 
because difficult Establishment Clause cases are certain to arise.  In fact, 
Michael Newdow has already refiled his lawsuit in federal court naming 
eight other parents and children as plaintiffs.320  The Supreme Court 
 
 315. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 178-79. 
 316. See Kathryn L. Mercer, A Content Analysis of Judicial Decision-Making – How Judges 
Use the Primary Caretaker Standard to Make a Custody Determination, 5 WM. & MARY J. OF 
WOMEN & L. 1, 59 (1998) (noting that “one of the main purposes [of implementing] an objective, 
rule-based standard is to limit judicial discretion and uncertainty”). 
 317. Johnson, supra note 10, at 178. 
 318. See generally Blake D. Morant, Lessons from Thomas More’s Dilemma of Conscience: 
Reconciling the Clash Between a Lawyer’s Beliefs and Professional Expectations, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 965 (2004) (analyzing the fundamental differences between personally held moral beliefs and 
professional expectations). 
 319. See supra notes 10-13, 70. 
 320. Kiran Krishnamurthy, Spotsylvania: Students Can Sit During Pledge, RICHMOND TIMES 
DISPATCH, January, 11, 2005, at B1.  Michael Newdow’s decision to have different plaintiffs bring 
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should use one of its upcoming Establishment Clause cases to 
acknowledge the insufficiency of its current approach and adopt a 
superior test in its place. 
James A. Campbell 
 
the suit corrects the standing deficiency that the Court used to dismiss Newdow’s first case.  See 
Newdow 542 U.S. at 17. 
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